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The International Judge in an Age of Multiple
International Courts and Tribunals
Suzannah Linton* and Dr. Firew Kebede Tiba**
I. INTRODUCTION
International law, although still unsophisticated in comparison to domestic
law, is increasingly showing signs of becoming a developed legal system. While
there remains no central legislator or enforcer, substantive international law has
come to be identified and codified in many areas, thanks in part to the work of
the International Law Commission ("ILC") and the Sixth Committee of the UN
General Assembly. Among the most striking expansions of the material scope of
international law are those that have taken place through the 1994 World Trade
Organization Agreement ("WTO Agreement"), which replaced the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT");' the entry into force of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS");2 the
numerous regional free trade agreements around the world;3 and the expansion
of international criminal law and international human rights law. Some argue
that there are specialized regimes developing in international law, but all agree
Associate Professor, University of Hong Kong. The author teaches Public International Law and
related disciplines.
Research Officer, University of Hong Kong. The author recently successfully defended his thesis
at the University of Hong Kong on the multiplicity of international courts and tribunals and its
impact on the coherent application of Public International Law. This article draws from some of
that earlier work. We thank Katherine Chan and Ernest Ng for their late night research, and the
editors for their efforts.
I Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1994), 1867 UN Treaty Ser 3
("WTO Agreement').
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), 21 ILM 1261 ("UNCLOS").
3 See, for example, Economic Community of West Africa States: Revised Treaty (1996), 35 ILM
660; North American Free Trade Agreement (1993), 32 ILM 289 ("NAFTA"); Treaty
Establishing a Common Market (1991); 30 ILM 1041 (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay);
Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community (1973) (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad
and Tobago), 12 ILM 1033.
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that previously separate areas are infiltrating others.4 The most striking example
is international human rights law, which finds its way into every aspect of human
life today, including other areas of international law.
As international law has developed, the number of participants in the
international legal system has grown. Gone are the days when states were the
only subjects of international law. The international landscape today is also
populated by participants having some kind of legal personality: international
organizations, individuals, and an enormous range of everything else, generally
lumped together under the category of nonstate actors. The latter includes
terrorist groups, international and domestic nongovernmental organizations and
transnational corporations. The significance of nonstate actors in almost all areas
of the international system is such that the International Law Association has
recently created a new committee to study the phenomenon.5
Within this evolving international system, legal disputes are increasingly
brought for resolution before judicial or quasi-judicial institutions. Emerging
disputes have sometimes required the establishment of new institutions for
settlement and resolution, as in the case of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims
Commission.6 Compulsory dispute-settlement clauses in treaties, such as in the
WTO Agreement,7 are a relatively new, but growing, phenomenon. The majority
of international judicial bodies are seized of cases through ex post facto consent,
such as that given through compromissary clauses or by way of separate
agreement; some examples will be studied in this Article.
The 1990s saw a marked quantitative and qualitative expansion of
international courts and tribunals.8 In 2004, the Project on International Courts
and Tribunals ("PICT") identified more than 125 "international judicial bodies"
and "quasi-judicial, implementation control and other dispute settlement bodies"
that have been created since 1868 (when the first American-Mexican Claims
4 Id. See also Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in
International Law, 17 EurJ Ind L 483, 484 (2006).
5 International Law Association, Proposal to Establish a ILA Committee for the Study of the Rights and
Obligations of Non-State Actors under International Law, available online at <http://www.ila-
hq.org/download.cfm/docid/AE325494-DFAA-4FCB-BA79F973CC5F54F6> (visited Dec 5,
2008).
6 See Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and
the Government of the State of Eritrea (2001), art 5, 40 ILM 260 (2001) ("Agreement of Algiers")
(creating the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission).
7 WTO Agreement, annex 2.
8 The words "international courts and tribunals," "international judicial bodies," and "international
judicial forums" are used interchangeably throughout this Article.
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Commission was created).9 Obviously, not all of these are currently active; the
list includes institutions that are temporary and permanent, as well as those of
the "first generation," and there is an obvious bias towards institutionalized
mechanisms of dispute resolution. Until the 1990s, there were only six
permanent international judicial bodies: the International Court of Justice
("ICJ"),10 the Court of Justice of the European Communities ("ECJ")," the
Court of Justice of the Andean Community, 2 the Court of Justice of the
Benelux Economic Union,13  the European Court of Human Rights
("ECtHR"),'14 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("IACtHR").is
One could expand this list to include the semi-permanent claims commissions or
arbitral tribunals such as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 6 which has been
operating since 1980, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID"),7 which was established in 1966, and the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, which was created in 1899 under the first Hague Convention for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. 8 The numbers can be
expanded further when we consider the many institutions of a more temporary
nature, involving single arbitrators or panel arbitration. This latter type of
international adjudication that does not occur under the auspices of an
international judicial body of relatively permanent nature is outside the scope of
this Article. International courts and tribunals operate at the universal, regional,
or sub-regional level, and are either general, as in the case of the ICJ, or
specialized, as in the case of courts such as ICSID and the Iran-US Claims
Tribunal. They cover all areas of international law. There is much reason to
argue that there is now "an evolving, complex and self-organizing" international
9 See Project on International Courts and Tribunals, The InternationalJudiciag in Context, available
online at <http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic-chart/synop-c4.pdf> (visited Dec 5,
2008).
10 See Statute of the International Court ofJustice (June 26, 1945), 59 Stat 1031 ("ICJ Statute").
11 The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") was established in 1958 as the joint court for the three
organs of the European Communities that later became the European Union in 1967.
12 Treaty Creating the Court ofJustice of the Cartagena Agreement (1979), 18 ILM 1203.
13 Treaty Instituting the Benelux Economic Union (1971), 381 UN Treaty Set 165.
14 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953), 213 UN
Treaty Ser 221.
15 American Convention on Human Rights (1978), 1144 UN Treaty Ser 143.
16 See Iran-United States: Settlement of the Hostage Crisis (1981), US-Iran, 20 ILM 223 ("Algiers
Accords") (establishing the Iran-US Claims Tribunal).
17 Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States (1966), 575 UN Treaty Ser 159.
18 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899), 32 Stat 1799 (1901-1903).
See also Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1907), 36 Stat 2199
(1909-1911).
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judicial system, even if it is one that appears to be "dancing on the edge of
chaos."' 9
At one level, the mere existence of such courts and tribunals is an incentive
to resort to litigation, rather than to the use of force, to resolve disputes. The
literature today often speaks of a "proliferation" of international courts and
tribunals, suggesting that this is a negative development. 20 Like the current
president of the ICJ, we do not feel that this "proliferation" is necessarily
negative or detrimental to the international order, and prefer the term
"multiplication ' 21 to proliferation. Since 2000, the ILC has been examining the
issue of multiplication in Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties A rising from
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law.22 One of the ILC's objectives
was to produce a "toolbox designed to assist in solving practical problems
arising from incongruities and conflicts between existing legal norms and
regimes. 23 It completed its work on this project in 2006, producing an academic
work that explored wide-ranging issues.24 The ILC, however, did not take up the
19 Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicial System, 56 Stan L Rev 429, 444 (2003).
20 The rather negative connotation is apparent in such tides as Chester Brown, The Proliferation of
International Courts and Tribunals: Finding Your Way through the MaZe, 3 Melb J Intl L 453 (2004);
Gilbert Guillaume, Advantages and Risks of Prolferation: A Bluepint forAction, 2 J Intl Crim Justice
300 (2004); Gerhard Hafner, Should One Fear the Proliferation of Mechanisms for the Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes?, in Lucius Caflisch, ed, The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States: Universal and
European Perspectives 25-41 (Martinus Nijhoff Law Specials, 36: Kluwer 1998); Robert Y. Jennings,
The Proliferation of Adjudicato7 Bodies: Dangers and Possible Answers, 9 Am Soc Intl Law Bull 441
(1995); Fausto Pocar, The Proliferation of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals: A Necessiy in the
Current International Community, 2 J Ind Crim Justice 304 (2004); Shane Spelliscy, The Proliferation of
International Tribunals: A Chink in the Armor, 40 Colum J Transnatl L 143 (2001).
21 See generally Rosalyn Higgins, A Babel ofJudidal Voices? Ruminationsfrom the Bench, 55 Intl & Comp
L Q 791 (2006). For another similarly strong sentiment from the bench, see generally Bruno
Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 Mich J Ind L 845 (2004).
22 United Nations, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, UN Doc A/57/10 at 237, 494 (2002).
The International Law Commission ("ILC"), in its fifty-second session in 2000, decided to include
the topic "Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law" in its long-term program of
work. The topic was later changed to its current form in order to tone down the perceived
negative connotations created by the word "risks." A study group led by Bruno Simma (later
appointed a judge of the ICJ) was established in 2002 to further study the subject. Upon Bruno
Simma's resignation, Martti Koskenniemi took over the chairmanship of the study group in 2003.
Consider id at 238, 495 (2002).
23 Id at 241, 512.
24 For the final report see United Nations, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law
Commission, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) ("ILC Report on Fragmentation"). For brief
conclusions of this very lengthy report, see United Nations, Conclusions of the Work of the Study
Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, Report of the International Law Commission, UN Doc No A/61 /10 at 407, 251
(2006).
Vol 9 No. 2
The InternalionalJudge in an Age of Muiple International Courts and Tribunals
institutional dimensions of fragmentation of international law, having excluded
that topic from the beginning.
2 1
This Article focuses on two fruits of the increasing fecundity of the system.
First, what is the international judge to do when there are several fora that could
deal with a dispute, apart from his or her own? Second, what is an international
judge to do when the jurisprudence on an issue is inconsistent between
international courts and tribunals? These emerging issues are actually evidence of
a maturing system. Mature legal systems, such as the domestic systems of
developed countries, provide the adjudicator with rules, techniques, and
principles that he or she could use to mitigate the adverse impacts that might
arise from the growth and diversification of the law. This maturity is not yet the
case with international law, which functions in a different system and is
controlled by different principles and concepts, not all of which are
uncontroversial. Decades ago, Hersch Lauterpacht identified the central role of
the international judge, arguing that "the existence of a sufficient body of clear
rules is not at all essential to the existence of law"; for him, what was decisive
was "whether there exists an international judge competent to decide upon
disputed rights and to command peace., 26 Today things are much more
complex. In these days of a crowded international system, there is no
consolidated guidance to help the international judge find Theseus's golden
thread to lead the way out, let alone rise to meet Lauterpacht's expectations.
We acknowledge the wealth of literature that already exists about the growth
of international courts and tribunals, and the increasing scrutiny of its impact.
27
PICT and the Brandeis Institute for International Judges have pioneered work in
this area, most recently leading to the publication of a major study on
25 The Study Group agreed that "the Commission should not deal with questions of the creation or
relationships among international judicial institutions," and should not "act as a referee in the
relationships between institutions, and in areas of conflicting rules." United Nations, Report ofthe
InternationalLaw Commission, Doc No A/57/10 at 240, 505, 507 (2002).
26 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 424 (Clarendon 1933).
27 See generally Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford
2003); Thomas Buergenthal, Prolferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or Bad?, 14
Leiden J Ind L 267 (2001); Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks,
31 NYU J L & Pol 919 (1999); Chester Brown, 3 Melb J Ind L (cited in note 20); Jonathan I.
Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 217 Recueil des Cours 101
(1998); Gilbert Guillaume, 2 J Ind Crim Just (cited in note 20); Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons
Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25 Mich J Intl L 849 (2004); Benedict Kingsbury,
Foreword Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31 NYU J L & Pol
679 (1999); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of InternationalJucidal Bodies: The Pieces of the PuzZle,
31 NYU J L & Pol 709 (1999); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification ofthe
International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 NYU J L & Pol 790 (1999); Eyal
Benvenisti and George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation
ofInternationalLaw, 60 Stan L Rev 595 (2007).
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international judges.28 The contribution the Article seeks to make is to provide,
in line with the precedent set by the Burgh House Principles on the
Independence of the International Judiciary,29 a blueprint to aid the international
judge in dealing with two of the more common ramifications of an ever-
expanding family of international law.
Before proceeding further, one must be clear about our use of the term
"international judge." It is more expansive than that of Terris, Romano and
Swigart, who define an "international judge" as someone who "serves on a body
whose jurisdiction includes more than one sovereign nation, or on a body
established by an international organization to deliver justice in a country where
the legal structure is deemed insufficient to address a severe situation, such as
the aftermath of ethnic cleansing or genocide., 30 The judicial entity (and we
focus on the judicial decision-making function in contrast to administrative or
legislative function) needs to be at least semi-permanent and responsible for
adjudicating disputes between two or more entities, at least one of which is a
state or international organization. We include the WTO dispute settlement
panels and the Appellate Body, even though it is actually the Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB"), by making a decision to adopt the "recommendations," that
accepts them and thus binds the parties to the finding set out therein.3' We
include international arbitrators, whether sitting alone or in panels. Terris,
Romano and Swigart view arbitrators as a different species of decision maker,
describing them as "judges for hire," although they acknowledge that some
international judges are much sought after as arbitrators.32 This Article does not
isolate the international judge from other decisionmakers in the wider scheme of
international dispute resolution; the issues discussed concern arbitrators as much
as they do judges. Thus, the term "international judge" in this Article refers to
the persons that Terris, Romano and Swigart identify, but also includes
arbitrators engaged in resolving international disputes between states, and
between states and nonstate actors such as corporations or individuals pursuant
to a treaty.
28 See Daniel Terris, Cesare P.R. Romano, and Leigh Swigart, The International Judge: The Men and
Women Who Decide the World's Cases (Brandeis 2007).
29 See Philippe Sands, Ruth Mackenzie, and Yuval Shany, Manual on International Courts and Tribunals
247-60 (Butterworths 1999). The principles were prepared by the Study Group of the
International Law Association on the Practice and Procedure of International Courts and
Tribunals, in association with the Project on International Courts and Tribunals.
30 Terris, Romano, and Swigart, The InternationalJudge at xi (cited in note 28).
31 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (1994), Annex 2,
arts 16 and 17(4), 1869 UN Treaty Ser 401 (Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization) ("DSU").
32 Terris, Romano, and Swigart, The International Judge at xi (cited in note 28).
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This Article focuses on two phenomena that have emerged, and are likely to
continue to emerge, from the growth of international courts and tribunals. These
phenomena are the engagement of multiple institutions in resolving a particular
dispute, and the risk of inconsistency, even conflict, in the jurisprudence of such
institutions. We concentrate on several examples, but do not pretend that these
are the only examples that international practice can furnish. Nevertheless, they
are particularly useful for helping us chart a way forward. To be acceptable and
workable, any such exercise must be grounded in the reality of the international
legal order and consistent with the fundamental principles and doctrines of
international law. Section II presents a conceptual examination of the situation
and studies the implications of the expanding world of international courts and
tribunals. Section III deals with multiple institution engagement and competing
jurisdictions, while Section IV deals with conflicting jurisprudence. Both
Sections III and IV are rooted in case studies. Section V concludes the
discussion, with Section VI synthesizing the earlier analysis and drawing from
relevant practices in both international and domestic systems to develop
guidelines to assist the international judge.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPANDING WORLD OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
Is the expansion of international courts and tribunals a problem at all? Is
choice not a good thing? Is there anything wrong with strengthening the rule of
law in the notoriously unruly international order? The world of international
lawyers and academics is divided. This split has to do, in part, with conceptual
orientations and practical considerations. Former presidents of the ICJ, Judge
Schwebel and Judge Guillaume, speak of "proliferation" as a threat to the
integrity and coherence of international law.33 In his 2000 address to the UN
General Assembly and its Sixth Committee, Judge Guillaume spoke of some
"unfortunate" consequences of proliferation.34  These "unfortunate"
consequences consisted of risks of overlapping jurisdiction leading to forum
33 See Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, Address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the
United Nations (Nov 6, 1999), available online at <http://www.icj-cij.org/court/
index.php?pr=87&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=l> (visited Nov 17, 2008). In his address, although
he had not extensively covered the dangers of "proliferation" like Judge Guillaume, his successor,
he nonetheless suggested that these other tribunals should refer issues of general international law
through the Security Council for the ICJ's advisory opinion (similar to the European Community
court's reference system).
34 Judge Gilbert Guillaume, The Proliferation of International Judidal Bodies: The Outlook for the International
Legal Order, Speech to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Nov
29, 2000), available online at <http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt=3&pl=
I&p2=3&p3=I> (visited Nov 13, 2008).
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shopping and conflicting decisions.35 He concluded his address by pointing out
that the "proliferation of courts presents us with risks, the seriousness of which
it would be unwise to underestimate.
' 36
The current president, Judge Higgins, does not share this view.3 7 She says
that "we should not exaggerate the phenomenon of fragmentation."38 In fact,
according to her, courts make tremendous efforts to both be "consistent inter se
and follow the International Court of Justice., 39 For her, differences in approach
can be explained by context: context is controlling.4 Observers may see the New
Haven approach in this.41 Scholars coming from the Critical Legal Studies
movement have ideology in mind: centralism versus decentralism, hegemony
versus empowerment, etc. For these scholars, the expansion of international law
presents an opportunity to contest the status quo. Among critical scholars,
Koskenniemi and Leino stand out for finding the concerns of the former
presidents of the ICJ to be mere postmodern anxiety.42 They see the
phenomenon as an outcome of the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic moves
made by participants in the system.43 Among these drives for hegemony, they
observe that the ICJ too is seeking to position itself.44 The problem, according to
these scholars, has "no overall solution."45 Koskenniemi and Leino point out
that "the ICJ, a human rights body, a trade regime or a regional exception may
each be used for good and for ignoble purposes and it should be a matter of
debate and evidence, and not of abstract consistency, as to which institution
should be preferred in a particular situation. ' 46 For these authors, the situation
reveals the importance of context in every case. Ultimately, rules can be
manipulated by their interpreters to suit particular predispositions or ideologies.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See Rosalyn Higgins, 55 Intl & Comp L Q at 791 (cited in note 21).
38 Id at 796.
39 Id at 797.
40 Id at 794.
41 See President Higgins' earlier works, notably, Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International
Law and How We Use It 274 (Clarendon 1993); Rosalyn Higgins, Poliy Considerations and the
InternationalJudicial Process, 17 Ind & Comp L Q 57 (1968).
42 See Martti Koskenniemi and Pliivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15
Leiden J Intl L 553 (2002).
43 Id at 562.
44 Id.
45 Id at 578.
46 Id.
Vol. 9 No. 2
The Internalional Judge in an Age of Muliple International Courts and Tribunals
The international legal system is populated by many participants, and
features intersecting subsystems as well as different sources of law. But it is not
alone in being a busy place. In the domestic arena, some legal systems,
particularly federal ones and others that formally recognize legal pluralism (the
existence of religious and customary law systems alongside state laws), face
similar problems on a day-to-day basis. Private international law is exclusively
concerned with the issue of conflicts. However, these systems are sufficiently
developed as to be able to anticipate predictable challenges and prepare for them
through constitutional provisions and subsidiary legislation.47 Domestic courts
have also developed doctrines that address these challenges, including lis alibi
pendens, res judicata, and forum non conveniens. Private international law is
assisted by a number of conventions, model rules and principles that have been
adopted on the key issues of conflict of laws, such as choice of venue, choice of
law, and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.45 Cannot the
international judge just do the same as is done in the domestic system when
dealing with such conflicts in the international system? In answering this
question, we have to begin with the unique characteristics of the international
legal system, which differ from national systems in three essential ways, and
which render wholesale import of domestic practices and principles unsuitable.
The first distinction is that while national legal systems usually have a judicial
hierarchy of sorts, 49 the international system has no such hierarchy. Courts
within the same structure (for example, appellate and trial chambers in an
international criminal tribunal) may have a hierarchy, but no international court
has the power to overrule another international court. Even the ICJ, the
principal judicial organ of the UN and the most senior of all the international
courts, lacks the power to overrule other international courts and tribunals.50
Neither is there a doctrine of stare decisis in international law, as exists in
common-law legal systems, where earlier decisions of a superior court are used
as authority in deciding future cases.5" An ICJ decision is not in itself a source of
law, but rather it is a subsidiary means of determining the content of
47 See Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, Conflict of Laws in a Federal System: Some Perspectives, 18 Intl &
Comp L Q 681 (1969). Consider John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J Legal Pluralism &
Unofficial L 1 (1986).
48 Consider Eckart Gottschalk et al, eds, Conflict of Laws in a GlobaliZed World (Cambridge 2007); Abla
J. Mayss, Principles of Conflict of Laws (Cavendish 3d ed 1999).
49 Even among the loosely affiliated judicial systems of the former British colonies, there has been a
practice of referring a case on appeal, as a matter of last resort, to the Privy Council.
50 While many domestic courts cite cases decided by the ICJ for their persuasive value, the reverse
seldom happens.
51 Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ sets out the formal position: "the decision of the Court has
not binding force except between the parties and in respect of the particular case."
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international law. 2 Hence, the greater the number of international judicial
bodies, the larger the risk of divergence between the legal approaches and
jurisprudence of these courts.
Secondly, in national legal systems, the lawmaking process is more or less
centralized.53 On the international plane, however, there is no central lawmaker.
International law is made in different ways, and there is no unified legislative
entity behind it.54 Thus, there is the possibility of conflict and inconsistency. For
example, international criminal law has evolved to include a range of different
concepts of "crimes against humanity," as a result of different notions employed
in the primary sources of law of international criminal courts and tribunals, and
the differences in their statutes. It is not just a question of law evolving over
time, for there exist three different notions of the crime against humanity in the
near contemporaneous Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR"), and the International Criminal Court.55 Two of the statutes emanated
from the Security Council and one resulted from a negotiated process between
states, although it was based on a draft prepared by the ILC. The sources of
international law generally lack the detail that exists in the domestic context. In
the case of treaties, this arises from the nature of the treaty-making process,
where the drafters strive for consensus and compromise to achieve agreement.
Thus, treaties are often vague-take for example the Outer Space Treaty, which
refers to "peaceful use" of outer space without a definition of what that means.56
And then there is the notoriously difficult issue of identifying not just the
existence but the precise content of customary rules. Here, the creators of the
law are states, by way of their practice and opinio juris. The general principles of
international law are also notoriously vague: it is easy to say, for example, that
proportionality is a general principle of international law, but exactly what does
that mean? It usually falls to the international judge to make a determination,
and that person will decide questions of law taking into consideration a range of
factors, which can include his or her legal tradition, philosophical approach,
openness to the work of other courts and tribunals, as well as willingness to see
52 Id, art 38.
53 Even in decentralized federal systems, lawmaking is centralized within their respective fields of
autonomy.
54 Simma and Pulkowski, 17 EurJ Intl L at 489 (cited in note 4).
5s See Security Council Res No 827 UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993); Security Council Res No 955 UN
Doc S/RES/955 (1994); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002), 2187 UN
Treaty Set 90.
56 Treaty on Principles Governing The Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, (1967), art IV, 610 UN Treaty Ser 205.
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his or her work as part of a larger whole, rather than simply confined to his or
her institution. Hence, international judicial outcomes can be unpredictable.
Thirdly, unlike national legal systems, and with one exception, there is no
hierarchy of laws in the international legal order. The one exception is laid down
in Article 103 of the United Nations Charter: charter-based obligations trump all
others (although those in turn would, in theory at least, be trumped by a norm of
jus cogens).57 The writ of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ specifies no
hierarchy of the sources of law that it lists, but international lawyers regard a
treaty, where there is one, as the primary source of applicable law.
These distinctions are rooted in the structure of the international system and
the nature of international law. Thus, for the international judge, conflicts of
jurisdiction and jurisprudence raise issues that are different from those that are
raised in domestic legal systems. They are problems that are systemic in nature,
arising from the structure of international law and the system in which it
operates. Given this, we would therefore argue that "systemic problems require
systemic solutions."' 8 These systemic solutions include reaching a consensus on
the proper role of international adjudication in the evolving international order,
as well as practical, shorter-term measures of institutional, substantive, and
procedural character. The theme of the proper role of the international judge in
the development of international law can be found already in Hersch
Lauterpacht's work.5 9 We cannot deal with the long-running dispute over the
proper function of international adjudication, but we acknowledge that this
debate is critical for dealing with the systemic evolutions underway. For
example, there is the ideological approach of Martinez, who argues that
the overriding purpose of the emerging international judicial system should be
to promote the federalism of free nations-a decentralized system of
cooperative relations among nations that, where possible, advances goals of
democracy and respect for individual rights and the courts participating in the
system should act in ways that further those goals.
60
Others would be more realistic. For example, Charney takes the view that
"the most important objective of international law [and international judicial
systems] should be the peaceful settlement of international disputes., 61 Even
without delving into the philosophical issues, it is clear that the international
57 See United Nations Charter, art 103. There are very few peremptory norms of international law
Vus cogens) on which there is consensus. These are some of the most serious international crimes
like genocide and slavery.
58 John P. van Gigch, System Design Modellng and Metamodeling 30 (Springer 1991).
59 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court 408 (Stevens 1958).
60 Martinez, 56 Stan L Rev at 461 (cited in note 19).
61 Jonathan I. Chamey, The Implications of Expanding International Dipute Settlement Systems: The 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90 Am J Ind L 69, 74 (1996).
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judge can no longer live in splendid isolation from the evolving international
system around him or her, and needs to take a wider perspective of his or her
role within that system. Judge Shahabuddeen of the ICTR Appeals Chamber hits
the nail on the head when he writes that international judges cannot behave as if
the general state of the law in the international community were not of concern:
"to act on that blinkered view is to wield power divorced from responsibility."62
In the meantime, and the ILC's efforts on fragmentation show that it will be a
long meantime, practical solutions are needed to prevent conflicts from arising,
as well as for managing conflicts when they do occur.
If institutional solutions are to be considered, one must ask whither the ICJ,
once clearly the World Court, and now one of many international courts and
tribunals dotting the horizon? In the same way that Article 38(1) of the ICJ
Statute does not set out a formal hierarchy, there is no formal hierarchy of
international courts and tribunals. The ICJ does, however, occupy a revered
place as the most significant of the international courts and tribunals. The ICJ
and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"), are
the only two international judicial bodies that have been popularly referred to as
the "World Court. 6 3 The reality is that just as one relies first on a treaty, when
such exists, one also seeks out an ICJ decision when it exists, and one looks
further afield only if the legal issue remains unresolved. The ICJ has not,
however, stepped up to take a leadership role in this new world. Even when
faced with an assault, in notably undiplomatic tones, by the ICTY Appeals
Chamber in Prosecutor v Tadic, the ICJ did not respond until directly pushed by
the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (the Bosnia Genocide
Case).64 And even then, it made no statement on its own role in a world of more
and more international courts and tribunals. Pierre Marie Dupuy stated the
obvious, which nevertheless needed to be stated, when he pointed out that "the
best way for improving the role of the ICJ as a world court rests in the hands of
the judges themselves, and in the way they view the true function of the court
within the international legal system."6
It is obvious that international judges need to communicate with their
counterparts in other international judicial institutions; they cannot live in
62 SemanZa v Prosecutor, Case No ICTR 97-20-A, Appeals Judgment, 25 (May 20, 2005)
(Shahabuddeen concurring).
63 Antonio Sinchez De Bustamante Y Sirvdn, The World Court 379 (Macmillan 1925); Shabtai
Rosenne, The World Court: What It Is and How It Works 230 (A.W. Sythoff 1962).
64 See Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 120 (July 15, 1999); Case Concerning the
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
HerZegotina v Serbia and Montenegro), 46 ILM 188, 403 (Feb 26, 2007) ("Bosnia Genocide Case").
65 Dupuy, 31 NYU J L & Pol at 802 (cited in note 27).
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splendid isolation. There are indeed regular exchanges of information and
periodic meetings of judges and officials of the different courts and tribunals.66
Charney, in his 1999 Hague lectures, examined areas where there has been
"judicial dialogue," or communication through the cases, between the ICJ and
other tribunals.67 The areas covered in his study included the law of treaties,
sources of international law, state responsibility, compensation for injury to
aliens, exhaustion of domestic remedies, nationality, and international maritime
boundary law. The "dialogue," as seen by Charney, consists of the citation of the
jurisprudence of the ICJ by other tribunals. 68 That "dialogue" is evident
elsewhere, in ICTY cases such as Prosecutor v Furund!zja and in IACtHR cases
such as LoayZa-Tamayo v Peru, both of which cite international jurisprudence.69
One weakness in Charney's study is the fact that the "dialogue" was a one-sided
affair; it is hard to sustain any pretence of a "dialogue" when only one side is
doing the talking. Other commentators warn not to make too much out of this,
for the examples of "dialogue" are actually very limited.70 The reality is that not
all judges keep abreast of relevant happenings at other courts and tribunals in an
age of growing specialization, and they cannot reasonably be expected to keep
abreast of everything being produced. Regardless, there is no doubt that
increased judicial interaction between international courts and tribunals
contributes to the coherence of international law and should be encouraged.
This Article submits that there are procedural techniques and legal doctrines
within international law itself that can be called upon for assistance, in particular,
treaty interpretation and the doctrines ofjus cogens, res judicata, and electa una via.
A way of bridging the gap is to resort to the accepted rules of interpretation
in international law, as codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention").7' This approach helps
standardize interpretation of a single treaty that is applied by different courts and
66 See, for example, the report about the official visit the judges of the ECJ made to the European
Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") to discuss the recent case law of the two courts. Court of
Justice of the European Communities, Press Release No 83/07 (Nov 9, 2007), available online at
<http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp07/visoff/ cp070083en.pdf> (visited Dec 5,
2008).
67 See generally Charney, 217 Recued des Cours (cited in note 27).
68 Id at 130.
69 Prosecutor v Furund!?/a, Case No IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, (July 21, 2000); LoyaZa-Tamqyo v Peri
Case 33, (Inter-Am CHR 1997). For another example of judicial "dialogue," see Bosphorus Hava
Yollari Turi!zm v Ireland, No 45036/98 (Eur Ct HR 2005) (clearly showing a flow of ideas and a
familiarity between the ECJ and the ECtHR).
70 Consider Nathan Miller, An InternationalJurisprudence? The Operation of "Precedent" Across International
Tribunals, 15 Leiden J Ind L 483 (2002).
71 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1980), arts 31, 32, 1155 UN Treaty Set 331.
Winter 2009
Li'nton and Tiba
Chicago Journal of International Law
tribunals. But this method, in itself, will not help when equally binding legal texts
have opposing or incompatible provisions. It is also an inescapable fact that the
formulations laid down in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, while
accepted as reflecting customary law, are in themselves susceptible to
individualized interpretation and application due to the flexibility and
malleability of the concepts employed, such as "good faith," "ordinary
meaning," "context," and "object and purpose." Treaty interpretation is not a
mathematical equation or a mechanical process that yields the same outcome in
all similar cases. Much will depend on who is doing the interpretation-in other
words, the international judge.
There are rules for preventing and managing the problem of multiple
institutions being engaged on the same dispute. The principle of eleta una via,
which is a shortened version of una via electa non datur recursus ad alteram ("one way
having been selected, recourse to another is not permissible"), prohibits multiple
submissions of essentially the same claim to different tribunals.72 The principle
of is alibi pendens (also called litispendance) requires tribunals to declare as
inadmissible applications being examined under different procedures.73 Electa una
via is about a choice of forum: once a forum is chosen, resort to another is
impossible. However, lis alibi pendens refers to the very fact that a dispute is
pending before another tribunal. While electa una via prohibits all forms of
multiple proceedings, lis alibipendens prohibits parallel proceedings only.74 This
means electa una via could also cover cases that may later fall under the res
judicata principle. As the PCIJ held, the object of lis alibi pendens "is the
prevention of the possibility of conflicting judgment, ' 75 and the same could be
said of electa una via. In the case of lis alibipendens, this means that it is possible for
a party to take the same dispute to another tribunal once the first proceeding is
72 Consider Shany, CompetingJurisdictions at 218 (cited in note 27). See also European Convention on
Human Rights (1950), Eur Treaty Ser No 5, art 35(2); Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (1984), General Assembly Res No 39/46, art 22(5),
available online at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h-cat39.htm> (visited Dec 5, 2008);
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (1981), A/RES/54/4, art 4(2)(1), available online at
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/text.htm> (visited Dec 5, 2008);
NAFTA, art 2005.
73 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), art 5(2), 6
ILM 383, 384 (1967).
74 Shany, Competing Jurisdictions at 218 (cited in note 27).
75 Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1925 PCIJ (set A) no 6 at 20 (Aug 25,
1925).
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finalized, but then it will be subject to the principle of res judicata, which is
widely accepted as a general principle of international law.76
Res judicata, also known as the principle of finality, has the same purpose as
/is alibi pendens to maintain judicial economy, promote legal security, and avoid
conflicting judgments.7 According to Bin Cheng, res judicata means that "once
a case has been decided by a valid and final judgment, the same issue may not be
disputed again between the same parties, so long as the same judgment stands."78
It simply precludes parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim.79
The principle has been applied by several international courts and tribunals, and
most recently was a major issue in the ICJ judgment in the Bosnia Genocide
Case.80
The use of the concept ofjus cogens as a means of resolving conflicts is more
controversial, with France refusing to accept that there is such a thing, or any
obligations that are owed era omnes.81 However, the majority of states, and the
learned authorities, are inclined to accept that there is such a notion. For
76 See, for example, Interpretation of Judgments Nos 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorz6w) (Anzilotti
dissenting), 1927 PCIJ (ser A) no 13 at 25 (Dec 16, 1927) (citing the proceedings of the
Commission of Jurists who drafted the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in
1920, describing res judicata as a clear example of "a general principle of law recognized by
civilized nations'), available online at <http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serieA/A1 3/
44_Interpretation des ArretsNo_7_et_8_UsinedeChorzowOpinionAnzilotti.pdf> (visited
Dec 5, 2008). See also Waste Management Inc v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No
ARB(AF)/00/3, (Award of June 26, 2002), 41 ILM 1315 (affirming that "[t]here is no doubt that
res judicata is a principle of international law, and even a general principle of law within the
meaning of Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice").
77 Some constitutive instruments that contain the principle of res judicata include: American
Convention on Human Rights (1978), 1144 UN Treaty Ser 123, art 47(d); Convention on
Conciliation and Arbitration within the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(1994), art 19(1)(a), available online at <http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001-144071/
10/4/00007971.pdf> (visited Nov 21, 2008). For a general discussion, see August Reinisch, The
Use and Limits ofRes Judicata and Lis Pendens as Procedural Tools to Avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlement
Outcomes, 3 L & Prac of Intl Cts and Tribunals 37, 44 (2004). See also lain Scobbie, Res Judicata,
Precedent, and the International Court- A Preliminary Sketch, 20 Austd YB Intl L 299 (1999).
78 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law: As Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 337 (Stevens
1953).
79 Black's Law Dictionay 1337 (West 8th ed 2004).
80 See Advisory Opinion of July 13, 1954, Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal, 1954 ICJ 47, 53 (July 13, 1954) ("A judgment rendered by a judicial body is
res judicata and has binding force between the parties to the dispute.'); ArbitralAward Made by the
King of Spain on December 23, 1906 (Hond v Nicat), 1960 ICJ 192, 213 (1960) (rejecting a challenge to
the arbitral award rendered by the King of Spain in a boundary dispute between Honduras and
Nicaragua, citing the res judicata nature of the earlier award); Judicial Decisions Involving.Questions of
International Law: The United States of America v The United Mexican States, 2 Am J Intl L 893, 901
(1908). See also Bosnia Genocide Case, 116.
81 Allain Pellet, Can States Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!, 10 Eur J Ind L 425, 428 (1999).
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example, the notion of erga omnes was codified in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties." The ICJ has used the notions ofjus cogens and erga omnes in a
way that clearly suggests a hierarchy of norms.83 Other international courts and
tribunals have also referred to notions ofjus cogens and/or erga omnes.8 4 Therefore,
we do believe that when a court or tribunal faces a conflict between normativeprovisions, one of which is of jus cogens character, the jus cogens norm must
prevail.
Bearing in mind reservations about wholesale import of the domestic into
the international, there are a number of procedural techniques used in private
international law that may be helpful if exported into the international system,
such as the doctrines of substantial connection, lis alibi pendens, forum non
conveniens, and choice of law.
In conflict-of-laws cases in which the parties do not agree on jurisdiction,
the issue is usually determined based on the principle of "substantial
connection."" The principle considers the connection between a forum, the
party, and the transaction or the place where the dispute occurred.86 Hence, if
one forum has a substantial connection based on these considerations, it will
have jurisdiction to the exclusion of other fora. This principle cannot be directly
applied to the public international law context because of its nonterritorial,
supranational nature. However, if the interpretation of two or more treaties is at
stake in a context where these treaties also contain respective dispute-settlement
mechanisms, it is reasonable to give priority to a tribunal that is vested with the
interpretation of a treaty substantially implicated. In this regard, in the Southern
Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v Japan) discussed later in this Article,
where both the UNCLOS and the Commission for the Conservation of
Southern Bluefin Tuna ("CCSBT") were implicated, the UNCLOS tribunal held
that even if the dispute also had the potential to arise under the UNCLOS, the
82 For brief but excellent background information, see generally Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositvum
andJus Cogens in InternationalLaw, 60 Am J Intl L 55 (1966). For a more recent work, see Dinah
Shelton, Normative Hierarcby in InternationalLaw, 100 Am J Ind L 291 (2006).
83 See Bosnia Genocide Case, 46 ILM at 230, 161; Case Concerning ArmedActivities on the Territoy of
the Congo (Congo v Rwanda), 45 ILM 562, 64 (Feb 3, 2006); Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of
the Construction of the Wall, 2004 ICJ 199, 155 (July 9, 2004); Advisory Opinion, Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ 257, 79 (July 8, 1996); East Timor (Port v Aust, 1995
ICJ 102 (June 30 1995); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Compaqy Lid (Beg v Spain), 1970 ICJ 3,
34 (Feb 5, 1970).
84 See, for example, Prosecutor v Furundf'a, Case No IT-95-17/-1 T, 155 (Dec 10, 1998).
85 See, for example, ALI UNIDROJT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, 2(1), available online at
<http://www.unidroit.org/engfish/principles/civilprocedure/ahi-unidroitprinciples-e.pdf>
(visited Dec 5, 2008).
86 This is a reflection of the principle that the applicable law should be that of the state that has the
closest and most real connection with the dispute.
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dispute was really under the province of the CCSBT.8  It decided that the case
should be resolved within the dispute-settlement mechanisms of the CCSBT,
and not the UNCLOS.88 The case is discussed in Section III.D below.
Common law jurisdictions seized of conflict-of-laws situations may refuse to
exercise jurisdiction over a case where there is concurrent jurisdiction with
another court on the grounds of forum non conveniens, or, alternatively, claim
jurisdiction on the grounds of being the forum conveniens.89 Although the rule
is said to have its origins in the Scottish legal system, which is an essentially civil-
law (mixed) jurisdiction, it is not often invoked in the civil-law systems of
continental Europe, which instead seem to rely on the closely related principle of
lis alibi pendens, discussed above.90 Forum non conveniens is defined as an
"inappropriate (inconvenient) court," referring to the principle whereby a court
that has jurisdiction over a claim nevertheless stays the suit conditionally, or
dismisses it unconditionally, in order to send the claim to be tried in another
jurisdiction to which the defendant is amenable and which the court believes is
more appropriate or convenient for the litigation, in the interests of justice.9
The gist of the rule on forum non conveniens is that one of the courts
relinquishes jurisdiction (dismisses or conditionally stays the proceeding) on the
ground that there is another, more convenient forum where the matter may be
adjudicated. A court may arrive at this conclusion based on several
considerations, which include hardship to the defendant in terms of costs,
location of witnesses and evidence in general, availability of an adequate
alternative forum for the plaintiff, issues of public policy, and several other
related factors.
At first glance, it seems that forum non conveniens may not be relevant for
international litigation. This is because inter-state litigation usually takes place, at
the choice of the parties, in neutral locations outside the territory of both parties
to the dispute, mainly at The Hague, Geneva; Washington, D.C.; London; Paris;
or Stockholm. There is, therefore, not likely to be much difference between any
of them on forum non conveniens grounds. The location of evidence and
87 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (AustlandNZ vJap), 39 ILM 1359, 153 (Aug 4, 2000).
88 Id, 54.
89 See William Tedey, Jurisdiction Clauses and Forum Non Conveniens in the Carriage of Goods by Sea, in
Martin Davies, ed, Jurisdiclion and Forum Selection in International Marilime Law: Essays in Honor of
Robert Force 183 (Kluwer 2005) (for a general comparative discussion).
90 Some of the exceptional uses of the lis alibipendens principle are in the state of Louisiana in the US
and the province of Quebec in Canada. This may be because there have been common-law
influences from neighbouring jurisdictions. See La Civ Code Ann § 123 (West 1960); S Q ch 64
§ 3135 (West 1991) (Civil Code of Qubbec).
91 See William Tetly, Glossary of Conflict of Laws, available online at <http://www.mcgil.ca/
maritimelaw/glossaries/conflicdaws/> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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witnesses does not pose much of a problem, since international litigation is
primarily composed of documentary evidence and oral pleadings from counsel.
However, we see that forum non conveniens may be useful in certain contexts,
for instance, in a situation where the dispute between both parties could more
appropriately be settled by regional dispute-settlement bodies. We can see that a
dispute, let us say between two Caribbean or Central American countries, could
more cheaply and effectively be dealt with by their respective regional courts
rather than the ICJ. If, therefore, a respondent in such a dispute pleads that the
ICJ is not a convenient forum, even if it technically has jurisdiction over the
matter, the court should defer on the grounds that it is not the forum
conveniens.
Choice of law is about the substantive law that courts apply to a dispute
before them. In principle, if there is no agreement between the parties, the court
may choose to apply the law of the forum (lexfon). This can also, in some cases,
resolve the issue of conflicting jurisprudence. In a conflict-of-laws context,
through the operation of conflict rules, or based on the agreement of the parties,
a court may apply a foreign law instead. Similar solutions could also be suggested
for international litigation. But we may find that judges of a given tribunal lack
the willingness or ability to venture outside of their area of expertise. One does
not have to be a human rights lawyer to feel great apprehension and concern at
the prospect of a WTO panel interpreting international human rights law. A
number of scholars and even the presidents of the ICJ have suggested that issues
of general international law be referred to the ICJ for interpretation, as doing so
would ensure consistency of legal interpretation on fundamental issues.92
However, those suggestions are often dismissed as impractical because of the
difficulty or near impossibility of amending the ICJ Statute.93 It may be more
practical for courts and tribunals to allow expert submissions during the
litigation in order to gain a better understanding of treaties that the judges are
called upon to interpret.
The foregoing discussion makes clear, even before examining concrete
examples, that managing duplication of claims, competing jurisdictions, and
conflicting jurisprudence is a formidable yet feasible task. In addition to careful
consideration and deployment of the arsenal of options, flexibility and open-
mindedness are required. Judges need to view the international judicial enterprise
as part of a collective effort that takes place within a connected international
92 See Schwebel, Address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly (cited in note 33);
Guillaume, Speech to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly (cited in note 34). See also
Louis B. Sohn, Broadening the Adisog Jurisdiction of the ICJ, 77 Am J Intl L 124 (1983).
93 See Sohn, 77 Am J Intl L at 125 (cited in note 92).
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legal system. This system depends on coherence and consistency in order to
regulate international society effectively.
III. CHALLENGES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE:
MULTIPLE INSTITUTION ENGAGEMENT AND
COMPETING JURISDICTIONS
The existence of so many courts and tribunals gives their consumers choices.
Some see that choice as encouraging forum shopping,94 which they see as a bad
thing. They reason that so long as tribunals with competing jurisdiction continue
to exist, the parties may find themselves spending unnecessary time and
resources arguing in different courts and tribunals about which forum is more
appropriate for the resolution of the dispute. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, a former
President of the ICJ, has argued that justice should not be based on the law of
the marketplace, that there are distorting effects of forum shopping.9" Judge
Guillaume underlined the risk of international judges being drawn into the
marketplace:
Every judicial body tends-whether or not consciously-to assess its
importance by reference to the frequency with which it is seised. Certain courts
could, as a result, be led to tailor their decisions so as to encourage a growth in
their caseload, to the detriment of a more objective approach to justice. Such a
development would be profoundly damaging to international justice. The law of
the marketplace, under the pressure of the media, cannot be the law of justice. 96
We see such concerns about forum shopping as exaggerated. If there are a
range of options from the start, the parties will have to choose. Parties may
consider different factors in choosing the most appropriate forum, ranging from
the favorability of the applicable law of the forum to tactical considerations that
might give them an upper hand over the other side. Practical issues are also
relevant to the parties, including access to the court or tribunal, the procedural
rules, the court's composition, its case law, or even its power to offer emergency
interlocutory or provisional measures. These are, of course, considerations that
are also relevant to potential litigants in the domestic sphere. They are all rational
94 Consider Andrew S. Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litgation (Oxford 2003).
95 Gilbert Guillaume, Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Oct 26, 2000), available
online at <http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=84&pt=3&pl=l&p 2 =3&p3 =1> (visited
Dec 5, 2008); Gilbert Guillame, The Proliferation of International Bodies: The Outlook for the International
Legal Order, Address to the Sixth Committee of the UNGA (Oct 27, 2007) available online at
<http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt=3&pl=l&p 2=3&p3=l> (visited Dec 5,
2008).
96 Gilbert Guillaume, Speech at the University of Cambridge, Lauterpacht Research Centre for
International Law 13 (Nov 9, 2001), available online at <http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/
lectures/doc/Guilaume.doc> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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and logical considerations, and there is nothing improper about them. They are,
like it or not, considerations of the marketplace. Sometimes, lodging complaints
before multiple jurisdictions is not an attempt to seek a peaceful resolution of
the dispute. Aggressive litigation of this kind may be a strategic effort to open
new front lines of battle and intimidate one's adversary. It can also be about
deliberately seeking to play to a local or wider audience, by creating the
impression of being the wronged party.
Sometimes, treaties themselves set up potential conflicts of jurisdiction. We
see this in Article 287 of UNCLOS, which requires the parties to choose from
four international dispute-resolution bodies: the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea ("ITLOS"), the ICJ, an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance
with Annex VII of the treaty, and a special arbitral tribunal constituted in
accordance with Annex VII for one or more of the categories of disputes
specified therein.97 The only guidance for resolving overlapping and conflicting
jurisdictions appears to be in Article 282, which envisages that states in dispute
can agree, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, that
their dispute be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, and
that such procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in Article
287.98 This, however, is easier said than done. The arbitral panel in one of the
cases examined later in this study, the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case,99 held that the
UNCLOS falls significantly short of establishing a truly comprehensive regime
of compulsory jurisdiction entailing binding decisions.1"' This is because there
are provisions within the UNCLOS itself that permit states to refuse to submit
to otherwise compulsory dispute-resolution mechanisms in certain situations."0
There is some confusion in the literature and we believe it is necessary to
distinguish three situations: first, a court or tribunal being simply "seized" of a
matter; second, a court or tribunal taking interim jurisdiction where there is a
request for emergency measures pending resolution of the dispute itself; and,
third, a court or tribunal determining that it has jurisdiction to hear the merits of
the case. The mere fact that there are complaints lodged at different institutions
by the parties does not equate with a conflict of jurisdiction. Several institutions
can be seized, but at this early stage, conflict is merely potential. Until the courts
or tribunals accept that they really do have jurisdiction over the same dispute,
there is no conflict as such. When they do find that they have jurisdiction the
potential conflict becomes an actual conflict of jurisdiction.
97 UNCLOS, art 287.
98 Id, art 282.
99 See Section III.D below for further discussion of this case.
100 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, 39 ILM at 1359, 62.
101 For instance, disputes relating to coastal water. See UNCLOS, art 297(3).
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Furthermore, the fact that different courts and tribunals are seized of
different issues arising out of a single situation, or a connected series of events,
does not mean there is a conflict of jurisdiction. The cases that are usually cited
as examples of conflicts of jurisdiction actually involve different courts looking
at different aspects of a single situation, with the claims founded in different
normative bases. This is not to say that the exact same complaint is not
sometimes lodged with different bodies. This happens quite frequently in the
human rights arena, which is heavily populated with courts, tribunals, and quasi-
judicial bodies. They have all developed rules on admissibility for controlling
such situations. 112 The latest example of multiple institutions being engaged has
arisen from the ongoing Georgia-Russia conflict over Southern Ossetia and
Abkhazia. Both the ICJ and the ECtHR have now become seized of inter-state
complaints. One alleges violation of the European Convention on Human
Rights (right to life, prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, and right
to property in Protocol 1),'1° and the other alleges violation of the 1965
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, with the right to lodge a complaint of genocide being
reserved.' Both arise out of the same situation, but they go to different issues
arising out of those same unfortunate circumstances. The seizing of the ECtHR
and the ICJ does not create a conflict of jurisdiction as such. What exists here
can instead be termed a multiple institution engagement ("MIE") over the
situation. This could actually lead to complementary jurisdictions, for together
they could ensure that there is full and fair coverage of the dispute. Hence, we
prefer to use the term MIE when referring to situations where we deal with
different courts and tribunals faced with different disputes arising out of the
same situation, and "conflicting jurisdiction" when we refer to situations where
the courts and tribunals really have a "conflict" over which of them should
exercise jurisdiction over exactly the same dispute arising from the same
situation. The merit of this approach lies in the reality that there really are not
many "conflicts," but there are plenty of MIEs, and it is important to distinguish
these situations. An MIE is not necessarily a problem, but a conflict between
judicial bodies over jurisdiction is.
102 See Laurence R. Heifer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U Pa L Rev 285, 308 (1999)
(analyzing the consequences of this diversity).
103 See European Court of Human Rights, Press Release, European Court of Human Ri'ghts Grants
Request for Interim Measures (Aug 12, 2008), available online at <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkp197/view.asp?action=htmI&documentld=839100&portal=hbkm&source=externabydocnum
ber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01 C 166DEA398649> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
104 See International Court of Justice, Press Release, Geogia Institutes Proceedings against Russia for
Violation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, available online at
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/14659.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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A. THE ICJ AND THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
PEOPLES' RIGHTS
The ICJ and the African Commission on Human Peoples' Rights ("African
Commission") were jointly seized through several inter-state complaints arising
from the international armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo
("DRC"). °5 All the cases were brought by the DRC against Burundi, Rwanda
and Uganda. Was this a mere MIE or a genuine conflict of jurisdiction?
Unlike the other regional human rights treaties, the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights ("African Charter") allows for consideration of
breaches of human rights treaties other than the African Charter. °6 The DRC
complaint to the African Commission alleged grave and massive violations of
human and peoples' rights committed by the armed forces of Burundi, Rwanda
and Uganda since August 2, 1998.07 It alleged that the respondents committed
armed aggression in violation of "fundamental principles that govern friendly
relations between States, as stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations and
the Organisation of African Unity.' ' 08 In addition to the violation of these
provisions, the DRC claimed that the respondents violated certain provisions of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949 and of the Additional Protocol on the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of June 8, 1977.
In The Hague, the DRC's complaints to the ICJ involved overlapping, but
not always identical, allegations in separate actions against Burundi, Rwanda, and
Uganda. The complaints alleged, among other things, acts of armed aggression
committed in flagrant breach of the UN Charter and of the Charter of the
105 See African Union, Twentieth Activity Report of the Afiican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
(2006) at 112, 1, available online at <http://www.achpr.org/english/activity-reports/
20th%20Activity'/o20Report.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008) ("Communication 227/99-DR
Congo/Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda") (for the complaint to the African Commission). For the
three complaints filed at the ICJ against Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, see also International
Court of Justice, Application Instituting Proceedings, Armed Activiies on the Temitoy of the Congo
(Congo v Uganda) (June 23, 1999), available online at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/116/7151.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008); International Court of Justice,
Application Instituting Proceedings, Armed Activities on the Territoy of the Congo (Congo v Rivanda)
(June 23, 1999), available online at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/117/7071.pdf> (visited
Dec 5, 2008); International Court of Justice, Application Instituting Proceedings, Armed Activities
on the Territoy of the Congo (Congo v Burundi) (June 23, 1999), available online at <http://www.ic-
cij.org/docket/files/115/7127.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
106 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981), 21 ILM 58, arts 60, 61.
107 Communication 227/99-DR Congo/Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda at 112, 2 (cited in note
105).
108 Id at 114, 8.
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Organization of African Unity ("OAU")). 0 9 They were also rooted in customary
international humanitarian and human rights law, as well as the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977110, the Convention
on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) of 1944111, the 1970
Hague Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft" 2 , and
the 1971 Montreal Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation." 3
The African Commission was the first to issue a decision. Burundi did not
appear before the Commission throughout the proceedings; Rwanda refused to
appear once the Commission declared the DRC complaint to the Commission
admissible." 4 The Commission, in its Thirty-third Ordinary Session in May 2003,
found all three respondent states had violated numerous provisions of the
African Charter and the UN and OAU Charters, as well as the humanitarian law
conventions, and ordered the respondents to pay "adequate reparations" to the
applicant." 5
At the ICJ, the DRC withdrew its case against Burundi and Rwanda on
February 1, 2001, but reinstituted its claims against Rwanda on May 28, 2002 for
"massive, serious and flagrant violations of human rights and of international
humanitarian law."'" 6 However, on February 3, 2006, the court found that it had
no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the DRC against Rwanda 1 7
The fact that the matter was pending before the African Commission was not
109 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v Uganda); Armed Activities on the Territogy of the
Congo (Congo v Rwanda); ArmedAtivities on the Terntogy of the Congo (Congo v Burundi).
110 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, 75 UN Treaty Ser 31, entered into force Oct 21, 1950; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, 75 UN Treaty Ser 85, entered into force Oct 21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 UN Treaty Ser 135, entered into force Oct 21, 1950;
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UN Treaty
Ser 287, entered into force Oct 21, 1950; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol 1), 1125 UN Treaty Ser 3, entered into force Dec 7, 1978; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), 1125 UN Treaty Set 609, entered into force Dec 7,
1978.
n 15 UN Treaty Ser 295.
112 860 UN Treaty Ser 105.
113 974 UN Treaty Ser 178.
114 Communication 227/99-DR Congo/Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, 52, 97 (cited in note 105).
115 Id, 98.
116 Case Concerning ArmedAetvities on the Territoy of the Congo (Congo v Rwanda), 45 ILM 562, 1 (2006).
117 Id, 64.
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among the reasons that led to the decision. Thus, only the case against Uganda
proceeded to the merits phase at the 1CJ. That case against Uganda was decided
by the ICJ on its merits on December 19, 2005. The ICJ found that Uganda,
through its actions and omissions, had contravened the rules on non-use of
force and non-intervention, violated its obligations under international human
rights law and international humanitarian law, and was responsible for acts of
looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources. 18 Uganda
was obliged to make reparations to the DRC.119
This example of an MIE, which did involve overlapping claims and sources
of law, did not lead to an actual conflict of jurisdiction. This was because the
two institutions ignored each other. The ICJ decision, coming some two years
after the decision of the African Commission, was silent on the involvement of
the Commission. However, the ICJ had informed the organs responsible for
supervising the implementation of treaties invoked in the dispute (or under
whose auspices the conventions were adopted) according to Article 69,
paragraph 3, of the rules of the court and Article 34(3) of its Statute. 20 However,
none of these organizations presented written observations.' At the African
Commission, the MIE situation was raised during the proceedings. Rwanda and
Uganda had, in their pleadings, referred to the ongoing litigation at the ICJ and
the involvement of other international political bodies as grounds for
discontinuation of the claims against them. Rwanda alleged that the African
Commission itself had not respected its own Rules of Procedure as "the matters
addressed by the communication were pending before competent authorities of
the Organization of African Unity and other international bodies like the UN
Security Council and ECOSOC.' '122 Uganda did raise the issue of the complaints
lodged by the DRC at several other venues, such as the UN Security Council,
the ICJ, the Lusaka Initiative, and the OAU. It described this as presenting a
"dilemma to the conduct of international affairs ... and adjudication" for
undermining the the credibility of these institutions and raising the risk of
divergent opinions. 23 Uganda also wanted the Commission to take note of the
118 Id.
119 Id, 259.
120 See Communication 227/99-DR Congo/Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, 13 (cited in note 105).
Article 34(3) of the ICJ Statute provides that: "Whenever the construction of the constitutive
instrument of a public international organization or of an international convention adopted
thereunder is in question in a case before the Court, the Registrar shall so notify the public
international organization so concerned and shall communicate to it copies of all the written
proceedings."
121 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Tertitory of the Congo, 45 ILM 562.
122 Communication 227/99-DR Congo/Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda 116, 22 (cited in note 105).
123 Id at 118, 34.
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DRC's failure to persuade the ICJ to order it (Uganda) to unconditionally
withdraw its troops from the territories it had occupied. Uganda also argued,
since the facts complained of by the DRC were pending before the ICJ, that
consideration of the Communication by the Commission would prejudice the
court hearing. In no part of its decision did the Commission address these
complaints or discuss the ICJ proceedings.
This situation of partly competing jurisdiction, therefore, led to two
decisions against Uganda. They related to the same facts, and cited some of the
same legal norms. The authors do not have any information that the decisions
were ever implemented. It is in this area of enforcement that the issue of overlap
will become critical. Here, Uganda would, if it complied with both decisions,
have had to give double reparation to Rwanda for the same acts.
B. THE MOX PLANT CASE
The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) saw the involvement of four
different judicial/quasi-judicial bodies seized of the matter of pollution by the
British nuclear waste processing plant at Sellafield in Cumbria, along the Irish
Sea.
1. ITLOS, the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal, and the ECJ
Ireland lodged its complaint against the UK under the UNCLOS on
October 25, 2001.124 This dispute first had to go to the ITLOS for determination
of a provisional measures application, before eventually being referred to an
arbitral tribunal, since neither party chose a forum under Annex VII, Article
287(5) of the UNCLOS.125
The ITLOS ascertained that an UNCLOS panel would be able to exercise
prima facie jurisdiction, which was necessary for the ITLOS to be able to
consider the provisional measures requested; it issued an order for provisional
measures on December 3, 2001 .126 This was not a definitive finding of
jurisdiction, but was as far as a decisionmaker in the position of ITLOS could
go. Prima facie jurisdiction was all that was needed at this stage, and ITLOS
could not usurp the role of the tribunal seized with the merits of the case to
conduct a full and complete examination of jurisdiction.
124 MOX Plant Case (Ireland v UI), 42 ILM 1187 (Perm Ct Arb 2003).
125 UNCLOS, art 287(5).
126 See MOX Plant Case (Ireland v UK), Request for Provisional Measures, 62 (ITLOS Dec 3, 2001),
available online at <http://www.itlos.org/case-documents/2001 /document en191.pdf>
(visited Dec 5, 2008).
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The Annex VII arbitral tribunal itself was later duly constituted in February
2002, and hearings were held in 2003.127 The tribunal accepted that it had prima
facie jurisdiction over the matter, but that was not enough to deal with the
merits. 1 28 The tribunal had doubts about whether it had that jurisdiction in a
"definitive sense.' 129 Under Article 292 of the European Communities Treaty ("EC
Treaty"), all disputes between European Community ("EC") member states
involving community law must be brought exclusively to the ECJ. 13 ° Oral and
written pleadings, notably from the UK, had left the tribunal concerned about
several related issues. Specifically, there arose doubts about the standing of
Ireland to institute these proceedings and the standing of the UK to respond, as
well as the division of competences between the EC (both Ireland and the UK
being member states) and its member states in respect of UNCLOS. The
tribunal was also concerned about a statement of the Commission of the
European Communities in the European Parliament which indicated that
proceedings were being considered against Ireland under Article 292 of the EC
Treaty for bringing the case against the UK under UNCLOS. The tribunal's
doubts about its jurisdiction were also exacerbated by concerns about the extent
to which provisions and instruments invoked by the parties could properly be
relied upon, as well as the matters which, by agreement of the parties, were
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ under EC law. It was not that the
ECJ clearly had jurisdiction, but the possibility that it had such jurisdiction left
the UNCLOS panel in doubt about whether it had sufficient grounds to exercise
its own jurisdiction.
Neither state argued that the MOX dispute in its entirety fell within the
exclusive competence of the ECJ, but the panel took an extremely cautious view
that it could not be said "with certainty that this view would be rejected by the
European Court of Justice."'131 There was also no certainty that the view would
be accepted. It appears that the panel had already made up its mind to "wait and
see" and was putting together the arguments to reach the desired conclusion.
The two states agreed that if the ECJ were to determine that it had exclusive
competence, this would preclude the jurisdiction of the panel entirely, by virtue
of Article 282 of the UNCLOS. 132 There was also the possibility that the ECJ
127 MOX Plant Case, 42 ILM 1187, J 1, 8.
128 Id, 14.
129 Id, 25 (emphasis added).
130 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1958), art 292, 298 UN Treaty Ser
11 ("Rome Treaty" as amended).
131 MOX Plant Case, 42 ILM 1187, 22.
132 Id.
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could find it had exclusive jurisdiction over only part of the dispute. It was not
clear to the panel
at this stage that the Parties are able to identify with any certainty what such
provisions might be; and the Tribunal is in no better position. For another,
there is no certainty that any such provisions would in fact give rise to a self-
contained and distinct dispute capable of being resolved by the Tribunal.'33
All these issues caused the UNCLOS panel, which already accepted that it had
prima facie jurisdiction, to stay the case rather than proceed to the merits. 34 In
effect, the panel deferred to the European Court, allowing that court to take the
lead in deciding the issue of jurisdiction, but reserving its own position. The
reasons for this deference appear to be rooted in what the panel described as
"considerations of mutual respect and comity which should prevail between
judicial institutions both of which may be called upon to determine rights and
obligations as between two States.' 3' The stay was only until the ECJ decided
on the issue of jurisdiction, or until the UNCLOS tribunal decided otherwise.
The European Commission did institute an action against Ireland before the
ECJ, which found that it had indeed breached its treaty obligations, both under
Article 292 of the EC Treaty and Article 193 of the Euroatom Treaty, which
gave exclusive jurisdiction to the ECJ on disputes relating to matters that form
part of the community legal order. 136 The court observed that certain provisions
of the UNCLOS formed part of the Community's legal order and that it had
jurisdiction to determine disputes on their interpretation and application. In
other words, it had exclusive jurisdiction over most of the dispute under EC law,
which includes certain provisions of the UNCLOS (with the exception of Article
123, most of the Irish claim was based on Part XII of the UNCLOS). 37
According to the ECJ, "the Convention provisions on the prevention of marine
pollution relied on by Ireland, which clearly cover a significant part of the
dispute relating to MOX Plant come within the scope of Community
competence which the Community has elected to exercise by becoming a party
to the Convention.' '138 The UNCLOS was able to be considered part of EC law
because the EC itself was a party to the treaty. 139 Consequently, these were rules
133 Id, 26.
134 Id. See also MOX Plant Case (Ireland v UK), Order No 4, Further Suspension of Proceedings on
Jurisdiction and Merits, available online at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fl_id=73>
(visited Dec 5, 2008).
135 MOX Plant Case, 42 ILM 1187, 28.
136 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland, Case 459/03, 2006 ECR 1-4635, 152 (May 30,
2006).
137 Id, 88.
138 Id, 120.
139 See UNCLOS, annex IX.
Winter 2009
.Unton and Tiba
Chicago Journal of International Law
which formed part of the Community legal order, and the court had
"jurisdiction to deal with disputes relating to the interpretation and application
of those provisions and to assess a Member State's compliance with them."' 4°
2. The OSPAR Tribunal
Ireland initiated parallel proceedings under the Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic
("OSPAR").'41 Article 32 of that convention provides for dispute resolution by
way of arbitration. 142 Ireland sought, citing Article 9(2) of the OSPAR
convention, to obtain information on the operation of the MOX Plant (OSPAR
makes it possible for a state to demand information "on the state of the
maritime area, on activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to affect
it"). 43
The OSPAR tribunal established its jurisdiction and, unlike the UNCLOS
tribunal, dealt with the merits of the case. There was no competing jurisdiction
with the UNCLOS tribunal, which did not cover the issue of information
pursued in this matter, or with EC law, both because the EU was not a party to
the treaty, and because this was not a treaty considered part of the Community
legal order. Both jurisdictional issues and the merits of the dispute were
discussed in the Final Award of July 2, 2003, one month after the UNCLOS
tribunal had decided to stay proceedings and three full years before the ECJ
issued its decision on jurisdiction.'" The tribunal observed that the "OSPAR
Convention contains a particular and self-contained dispute-resolution
mechanism in Article 32, in accordance with which this Tribunal acts., 14' The
issue of jurisdiction was resolved by virtue of the evidence presented, as well as
by considering Article 32. There was no issue of prima facie jurisdiction; this
ruling was about definitive jurisdiction. The issue of EC legislation was not
considered; the UK only raised the argument that its institutional framework was
sufficient to prevent the jurisdiction of the panel. The panel rejected that claim
and proceeded to the merits. The tribunal then held that the class of information
being sought by Ireland did not fall within the scope of Article 9(2). It found
140 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland, 2006 ECR 1-4635, 121.
141 See Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Artick 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ireland v UK), 42
ILM 1118, 1 (2003).
142 Convention for the Protection the Marine Environment of the Northern Adantic (1992), 32 ILM
1069, art 32.
143 Id, art 9(2).
144 Dispute Concerning Access to Information underArlicle 9, 42 ILM 1118.
145 Id, 143.
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that the UK had not violated its obligation under the OSPAR Convention by
not disclosing information about the operation of the MOX Plant to Ireland.
Looking at the proceedings as a whole is instructive. Ireland triggered the
UNCLOS dispute-settiement procedure on October 25, 2001.146 Those
proceedings were suspended from June 24, 2003 until June 6, 2008, with the two
parties submitting periodic reports in accordance with the panel's earlier
decisions. 4' The panel terminated the proceedings some two years after the ECJ
decision and only after the withdrawal, by Ireland, of its claim against the UK.
148
It never decided to defer its prima facie jurisdiction to that of the ECJ; it only
suspended proceedings, and terminated after the parties withdrew. The OSPAR
arbitration commenced on June 18, 2001, but unlike the UNCLOS tribunal, the
OSPAR tribunal was able to decide the issue brought to it (on July 2, 2003).
Critical observers could understandably see the UNCLOS process as seven
unnecessarily wasted years. Those of less-critical disposition could, on the other
hand, see that even if unintentional, the staying of proceedings created a space
within which the parties could engage in dialogue. This was so successful that to
date Ireland has not resorted to using legal mechanisms to reinstate this claim
against the UK. Ireland now participates in various collaborative mechanisms
with the UK. At the time of writing, it appears that the Sellafield plant is being
defuelled and partially decommissioned.'49
The MIE arising from the MOX Plant Case falls within the category of
jurisdictional disputes that Lowe would categorize as general-specific (involving
what he sees as jurisdictional competition between courts of general and specific
jurisdiction). Lowe believes that this kind of overlap could be solved within the
framework of the Vienna Convention. 5 ° For him, the first consideration is
whether one agreement has modified the application of the other.' 5' While Lowe
doubts there could be two treaties that give exclusive jurisdiction to two
different tribunals, he nonetheless concedes the possibility of there being one
treaty which gives an exclusive jurisdiction to a particular body, and another
146 MOX Plant Case (Ire/and v UK), Request for Provisional Measures, preamble.
147 MOX Plant Case (Ireland v UK), Order No 6: Termination of Proceedings, available online at
<http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/MOX%20Plant%/ 200rder/20No./206.pdf> (visited
Dec 5, 2008).
148 Id.
149 See the website of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, available online at
<http://www.nda.gov.uk/sites/sellafield/> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
150 Vaughan Lowe, Overlapping Jurisdiction in International Tribunals, 20 Austi YB Ind L 191, 193-94
(1999).
151 Id at 193.
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treaty being non-specific." 2 Under such circumstances, the operation of the
principle of lex specialis generalibus derogat modifies the relationship between both
treaties." 3 Based on the operation of this maxim, Lowe argues that "the tribunal
of general jurisdiction must decline to accept the case, because the parties are
legally bound to refer the case to another tribunal."' 54 As a matter of principle,
the parties' original intentions should be given precedence. However, there is no
hard rule that forces judicial bodies to abdicate their jurisdiction in favor of
another. In the MOX Plant Case, the ECJ did not have exclusive jurisdiction over
the entire dispute, and there remained a residual role for the UNCLOS panel.
The UNCLOS arbitrators did not need to suspend the proceedings and
adopt a wait-and-see approach that essentially deferred to the ECJ. They could
have taken the view that prima facie jurisdiction was sufficient to deal with the
case on its merits. They could also have taken the view that they could not
exercise jurisdiction when jurisdiction had not been "firmly established." In the
Chorzfdw Factogy decision, the PCIJ took the position that the court, when it has
to define its jurisdiction in relation to that of another tribunal, cannot allow its
own competence to give way unless confronted with a jurisdictional clause
which it considers "sufficiently clear" to prevent the possibility of negative
conflict jurisdiction involving the danger of a denial of justice.' This same
court, in the same case, laid down the general principle for asserting jurisdiction
in a positive sense:
When considering whether it has jurisdiction or not, the Court's aim is to always
ascertain whether an intention on the part of the Parties exists to confer
jurisdiction upon it. The question as to the existence of a doubt nullifing its
jurisdiction need not be considered when... this intention can be demonstrated
in a manner convincing to the Court.' 56
The court's dictum here clearly indicates when a court may relinquish its
jurisdiction (negative sense) and when it can assert its jurisdiction (positive
sense). Nonetheless, when it comes to the negative sense, the standard of
"sufficiently clear" is obviously lower than the "firmly established" standard
used in the MOX Plant Case by the arbitral panel (the prima facie standard of the
ITLOS itself was predetermined by Article 290(5) of the UNCLOS). The
UNCLOS panel, to be satisfied of having jurisdiction in a "definitive sense,"
required that its own jurisdiction be "firmly established" or that it be "firmly
152 Idat 194.
153 Idat 195.
154 Id.
lss Case Concerning the Factoy at ChorZdw (Ger v Pol), 1927 PCIJ (ser A) no 9 at 30 (July 26, 1927),
available online at <http://www.icj-cij.org/pci/serieA/A_09/28_Usine-de Chorzow_
CompetenceArret.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
156 Id at 32 (emphasis added).
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established" that another tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction. Following this line
of reasoning, a court or tribunal that is not convinced of its jurisdiction should
be free to adopt the wait-and-see approach or decline to exercise jurisdiction. If
there is a situation of two courts with nonexclusive jurisdiction (Lowe's general-
general category), then any overlap could be resolved using some of the tools
suggested above, such as "substantial connection" and lex ipecialis.
57
This tribunal clearly sensed a major dispute over jurisdiction on the horizon;
they also saw the risk of a conflict of jurisprudence."5 8 The fact that
"considerations of mutual respect and comity which should prevail between
judicial institutions both of which may be called upon to determine rights and
obligations as between two States" came to be considered as relevant in the
decision to suspend reveals that the panel was considering the overall impact of
such a conflict on the international system of dispute resolution.5 9 This suggests
recognition that international law is the cement of the international system, and
that international judges, as major actors in that international system, should not
be territorial and competitive about the exercise of jurisdiction. They should
instead grasp their important role in maintaining a degree of coherence within
this system.
The OSPAR panel's approach was clearly different from that employed by
the UNCLOS panel. Here was a panel that held that "the first duty of the
Tribunal is to apply OSPAR."' 6 ° It made no distinction between prima facie
jurisdiction and "firmly established" jurisdiction; the question was whether the
panel had jurisdiction, and this question was answered in the affirmative. The
particular circumstances, with no foreseeable MIE, allowed for a straightforward
process. The seriousness of the matter being litigated was also very different:
both cases concerned the alleged breach of a treaty, but the case before
UNCLOS concerned the claim of a serious breach of the treaty arising from
alleged pollution, while the OSPAR matter was about alleged failure to provide
information pursuant to the treaty (presumably such information was sought
with a view to facilitating the UNCLOS proceedings).
C. THE SWORDFISH CASE
The ITLOS can have competing jurisdiction with the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB"). We see this well illustrated in the Swordfish Case (Chile
157 Section III.D below returns to this point of the standard for exercise of jurisdiction when it
examines the Southern Bluefin Tuna dispute.
158 MOX Plant Case, 42 ILM 1187.
159 Id, 128.
160 Dispute Concerning Access to Informaion underAricle, 42 ILM 1118, 84.
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v European Communiy).' 6' The case concerned Chile's closing of its ports to
certain EU (primarily Spanish) ships because Chile considered the fishing of
swordfish to be a violation of relevant provisions of the UNCLOS. Chile's
actions prevented swordfish-carrying boats not only from accessing ports, but
also from storing and transferring to other boats. After the parties failed to settle
the dispute amicably, they both took their cases to different tribunals: Chile took
the matter to the ITLOS complaining about violation of the UNCLOS, and the
EU went to the WTO citing violation of trading rules laid down in the GATT.62
The Swordfish Case was therefore about each party going to a different court,
complaining about a violation of a different treaty. One party argued that the
dispute was about environmental issues, while the other argued that it was about
international trade rules. The dispute, therefore, was not about conflicting
jurisdiction but about MIE.
At the WTO, the EU claimed that the Chilean prohibition on unloading of
swordfish in its ports under Article 165 of its Fisheries Law was inconsistent
with GATT's Article V.163 This provision provides for freedom of transit for
goods through the territory of each contracting party on their way to or from
other contracting parties. The EU also invoked GATT Article XI, which
prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports or exports, subject to some
exceptions for imports of agricultural or fisheries products.16 1
At the ITLOS, Chile complained about the EU's conduct, citing UNCLOS
Articles 64 (calling for cooperation in ensuring conservation of highly migratory
species), 116-19 (relating to conservation of the living resources of the high
seas), 297 (concerning dispute settlement), and 300 (calling for good faith and no
abuse of right).165 Chile further claimed that the EU failed to enact and enforce
substantive conservation measures on its vessels fishing in the area pursuant to
Articles 116 and 119 of the UNCLOS. 66 It alleged that the EU did not report its
swordfish catch to the relevant organization, and that it failed to cooperate with
the coastal state (Chile) in ensuring the conservation of highly migratory
161 See Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern
Pacific Ocean (Chile v EC), 40 ILM 475 (ITLOS 2000).
162 See World Trade Organization, Request for Establishment of a Panel by the European
Communities, Chile--Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish, WTO Doc No
WT/DS193/2 (Nov 7, 2000).
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 ITLOS, Case Concerning the Conservation of and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-
Eastern Padfic Ocean (Chile/EU), Constitution of Chamber, Order, 2(3)d (Dec 20, 2000).
166 Id, 2(3)(a).
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species. 67 In response to Chile's allegations, the EU asked for a finding that
Chile violated UNCLOS Articles 64, 116-19, 300, 87 (on freedom of the high
seas including freedom of fishing, subject to conservation obligations), and 89
(prohibiting any state from subjecting any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty).
Before either panel could deal with the issue of jurisdiction, both parties
reached a provisional agreement and suspended proceedings. 169 Both parties
undertook to resume bilateral cooperation on the matter, although proceedings
may be reactivated if that fails. The ITLOS Special Chamber, in its order of
December 29, 2005, upon the written request of the parties, authorized
suspension of the proceeding for two more years. 70 A similar decision was also
made by the WTO DSB on March 23, 2001, with the EU reserving the right to
revive the proceedings at any time.' 7 ' This is, therefore, still a live matter.
The Swordfish Case reveals the dangers of specialized courts that are
constructed as if they operate within hermetically sealed regimes of law. It
reveals the fallacy of such an understanding in an increasingly interdependent
legal world. The Swordfish Case involved genuine disputes over international trade
rules and environmental protection arising out of commercial fishing for the
swordfish of the southeastern Pacific Ocean. Looking at this matter in a
compartmentalized way is artificial and highly problematic. We believe that were
it ever to revert back to dispute settlement procedures, the dispute should be
considered by a court with general jurisdiction, which would be able to examine
the dispute in its entirety. In an ideal world, the disputes should be withdrawn
from the tribunals already seized, and referred to the ICJ by Spain and Chile
through an agreement (compromis). Nevertheless, we see again the problem of
specialized courts with narrow subject matter jurisdictions. While the UNCLOS
requires compulsory dispute settlement but allows a range of options including
referral to the ICJ, the WTO Agreement only permits dispute settlement under
its auspices. The WTO's dispute settlement procedure binds disputing parties to
a set procedure. A dispute may ultimately end up before the Appellate Body, but
at no stage does such a dispute go outside the WTO. Arbitration is encouraged,
167 Id, 2(3)(b).
168 Id, 2(3)(e)-(g).
169 See World Trade Organization, Arrangement between European Communities and Chile,
Communication from the European Communities, Chile-Measures Affecting the Transit and
Importation of Swordfish, WTO Doc No WT/DS193/3 (Apr 6, 2001).
170 See Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern
Padfic Ocean (Chile v EC), Case No 7, Order 2005/1 (ITLOS Dec 29, 2005).
171 See World Trade Organization, Arrangement between European Communities and Chile,
Communication from the European Communities, Addendum 3, Chile--Measures Affecting the
Transit and Importation of Swordfish, WTO Doc No WT/DS193/3/Add.3 (Dec 22,2005).
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but under Article 25(1) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), and
has to be used in the WTO context. Thus, while a compromis referral to the ICJ
may work in other disputes, no trade dispute that involves member states of the
WTO can go outside that body. The rigidity of the WTO dispute settlement
regime may mean that the parties just have to pursue parallel litigation in
different courts and tribunals where the disputes impact areas other than
international trade.
It seems logical that if jurisdiction of a court or tribunal is made exclusive by
its controlling treaty (as with the EC Treaty in the ECJ's MOX Plant judgment),
then that body should indeed take jurisdiction over those matters. However, in
the Swordfish Case, there were issues over which both tribunals seemed to have
jurisdiction. For example, both tribunals would seem to have equal jurisdiction
to decide on matters relating to access to fishing vessels and on the justifiability
of the environmental protection measures taken by Chile. Lowe offers another
way of looking at this: if two specialized courts have jurisdiction on matters
arising from the same fact, both courts should be allowed to exercise jurisdiction
by virtue of the principle of lex .specalis.'72 He stresses,
In such a case the two jurisdictions would not overlap-and any argument that
they might overlap would fall in the face of the lex (peialis principle, which
plainly requires the GATT disputes go to the WTO and the Law of the Sea
dispute to go to the ITLOS. The claims would not overlap, even though they
spring from the same facts.
173
On the other hand, however, it is entirely possible that a decision by one of the
tribunals might make compliance with the decision of the other tribunal difficult,
if not impossible.
Another possibility for resolution of the problem of competing jurisdiction
would be for one of the two bodies to be granted jurisdiction to hear disputes
raised before the other. For example, the WTO could deal with matters of the
UNCLOS or the UNCLOS panel could deal with WTO matters. Theoretically,
if the parties agreed, they could refer the entire dispute to that institution.
However, things are not that simple. UNCLOS panels cannot deal with disputes
concerning anything but UNCLOS.7 4 At the WTO, the UNCLOS is not one of
the treaties listed in Annex I1 (Appendix I and 11) of the DSU as a multilateral
treaty that can be considered under that procedure.' The DSB is empowered,
in Article 3(2), only to clarify the existing provisions of accepted agreements "in
172 See Lowe, 20 Austl YB Intl L at 203 (cited in note 150).
173 Id.
174 UNCLOS, art 288.
175 DSU, Annex 2.
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accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law."' 76
This speaks to treaty interpretation and is obviously not carte blanche to import
in a treaty such as the UNCLOS. However, rules of treaty interpretation do
allow for reference to the other international legal obligations of the state. 177
Specifically, these rules provide that the decisionmaker, in interpreting the treaty,
is to consider, along with the context, a number of issues that include "any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.' '178 A treaty such as the UNCLOS could arguably fall into the category of
rules of international law to be considered. The recently completed ILC project
on Fragmentation of International Law explored at length the possible use of
this Vienna Convention rule, and examined the practice across various
international judicial bodies.7 9 It concluded that "when several norms bear on a
single issue, they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise
to a single set of compatible obligations."' ° It referred to this principle of
interpretation as a principle of harmonization. 81 For the ILC:
International law is a legal system. Its rules and principles (i.e. its norms) act in
relation to and should be interpreted against the background of other rules and
principles. As a legal system, international law is not a random collection of
such norms. There are meaningful relationships between them.
182
This soaring rhetoric is unlikely to stand a chance in the face of fierce
competition between diverse interests operating in the different regimes of
international law. We should not exaggerate, however; sometimes such
competition may boil down to turf wars between the high priests of the various
subsystems of international law.'83
176 Id, art 3(2).
177 Vienna Convention (1969), art 31(3).
178 Id, art 31 (3) (c)
179 ILC Report on Fragmentation at 88, 167, n 223 (cited in note 24).
180 Id at 9, 4.
181 Id.
182 Id at 1, 1.
183 A representative example is the "Alston-Petersmann controversy," so called after the heated
debate between the two scholars, both apparently rooted in and representing the human rights
regime and the trade regime, respectively. Compare Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and
Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 Eur J Intl L 815 (2002), with
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Taking Dignity, Rights, Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously:
Rejoinder to Alston, 13 Eur J Intl L 845 (2002).
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D. THE SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA CASE
Another important and familiar situation that resulted in MIE is the Southern
Bluefn Tuna Case between Australia, New Zealand, and Japan." 4 The case
involved exploitation of, and conservation measures to protect, bluefin tuna in
the oceans of the southern hemisphere ("SBT"). This species of fish is included
in the list of highly migratory species set out in Annex I of the UNCLOS.'85 In
1982, Australia, New Zealand and Japan started informally to manage the
catching of the SBT.'86 In 1993, the parties replaced their pre-existing
arrangement with the Convention for the Preservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna
("SBT Treaty"), in which they agreed to protect these fish. 87 The SBT Treaty
established the Commission for the Conservation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna
("CCSBT"). The CCSBT's main function is to decide upon measures for the
management of the SBT such as total allowable catch, the amount that each
state may catch (national allocation) and additional measures.'88
In the late 1990s, however, Japan sought to increase the catch limit because
of the improved fish stock situation, and to that end, recommended
experimental fishing. Australia and New Zealand suggested an alternative
procedure. With no agreement on how to proceed, Japan unilaterally began what
it called an Experimental Fishing Program. The pilot project took place between
July 10 and August 31, 1998, catching 1,464 tons in addition to that year's
national quota.'89 Australia and New Zealand challenged the legality of the
Japanese action under the SBT Treaty. With a view to resolving the dispute, an
ad hoc working group investigating the possibility of carrying out a joint
experimental fishing program was established. However, the program failed to
resolve the dispute and on June 1, 1999, Japan initiated a broader Experimental
Fishing Program.
Australia and New Zealand resorted to dispute settlement. They had two
choices: the dispute-settlement procedures of the UNCLOS or an ad hoc arbitral
tribunal constituted under Article 16 of the SBT Treaty.' 90 As already noted, the
UNCLOS itself provides for four types of judicial dispute settlement: the ICJ,
the ITLOS, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of
184 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, 39 ILM 1359 (Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII of
UNCLOS 2000).
185 UNCLOS, Annex 1.
186 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, 39 ILM 1359.
187 Convention for the Preservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (1994), 1819 UN Treaty Set 360.
188 Id, art 8(3)(a)-(b).
189 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, 39 ILM 1359, 25.
190 Convention for the Preservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, art 16.
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the Convention, and a special Arbitral Tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VIII of the Convention.' Of the available fora, the applicants opted for
arbitration under UNCLOS, alleging that Japan had breached its obligations
under Articles 64 and 116-19 of that treaty, and sought interim measures.'92
Some of these UNCLOS provisions were not exclusive to that treaty. In other
words, they could also be found in the SBT Treaty.
As in the MOX Plant Case, the ITLOS was the first to be engaged. Before it
could do anything on the interim measures, the ITLOS had to satisfy itself that
there was prima facie jurisdiction for an UNCLOS arbitral panel. For Japan, the
dispute was about the interpretation and implementation of the 1993 SBT
Treaty, not UNCLOS. Thus, Japan argued, jurisdiction had to be constituted
according to Article 16 of the SBT Treaty. 9 3 Further, Japan argued that treaty
was both lexposteior (the later law prevails over the former) and lex specialis (the
special law prevails over the general) to the UNCLOS. 194 Japan also invoked
Article 281 of the UNCLOS, which allows parties to confine the applicability of
compulsory procedures to cases where all the parties to the dispute had agreed
to submit the dispute to those procedures. 95 The ITLOS found that an
UNCLOS panel under Annex VII would prima facie have jurisdiction, and thus
it could hear the matter; it ordered the interim measures. 196 Ad hoc Judge Ivan
Shearer addressed jurisdiction in a separate decision, going so far as to state that
jurisdiction in this matter went "beyond the level of being merely prima facie"
and should be "regarded as clearly established."' 9 He observed that the Japanese
objection to jurisdiction, on the grounds that this dispute had nothing to do with
UNCLOS, was really a matter of justiciability, and argued that in this case the
issues of justiciability and jurisdiction were inextricably linked.' 98 Ad hoc Judge
Shearer viewed Article 16 of the CCSBT as establishing a nonbinding,
nonexclusive parallel dispute-resolution procedure to that of the UNCLOS. 99
The dispute was, to him, one arising under the UNCLOS, even if the two
191 See UNCLOS, art 287.
192 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, Provisional Measures, 38 ILM 1624, 31-32 (ITLOS Aug 27, 1999).
193 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, 39 ILM 1359, 28.
194 Id, 38(c).
195 Id, 56.
196 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, Provisional Measures, 38 ILM 1624, 62.
197 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, 39 ILM at 1647 (Shearer concurring).
198 Id.
199 Id at 1648.
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instruments were inherently interlinked. °° Thus, he found the Japanese attempt
to separate the dispute into two different baskets was highly artificial.20'
The case went forward to a duly constituted UNCLOS panel. On August 4,
2000, the majority declined to exercise jurisdiction, persuaded by the Japanese
argument that Article 16 of the SBT Treaty was an agreement by the parties to
seek the settlement of this particular dispute by peaceful means of their own
choice, although it stressed that the dispute between the parties arose both under
the UNCLOS and the SBT Treaty.20 2 It also reversed the prima facie jurisdiction
finding of the ITLOS and the interim measures that it ordered. The panel took
the position that there was a single dispute arising under both conventions, not
two separate disputes.20 3 It agreed with Japan that Article 16 of the SBT Treaty
itself was an agreement by the parties to seek settlement of the instant dispute by
peaceful means within the framework of that treaty.20 4 The parties should have
continued that process rather than resorting to external dispute settlement. Also,
the ordinary meaning of Article 16 made it clear that the method of settlement
must be based on the consent of all the parties, which was absent in this case.205
This MIE raises the kind of potential "conflict" that Lowe has identified as
"specific-specific": this was a case where two specialized tribunals appeared to
have prima facie jurisdiction over the same matter.20 6 Here, Australia and New
Zealand had attempted to resolve their dispute with Japan through the SBT
Treaty, including Article 16. It was only after those efforts failed to produce a
satisfactory resolution of the dispute that Australia and New Zealand resorted to
outside dispute settlement, choosing to do so by way of UNCLOS arbitration.
The Annex VII panel forced the parties back into a cycle of fruitless
negotiations in the CCSBT, and into a situation where one party was proceeding
over the objections of the others. Ad hoc Judge Shearer, in his separate opinion,
correctly described this as being essentially circular. In the panel's view, Article
16 of the SBT Treaty was meant to exclude compulsory jurisdiction.27 Also
relevant was the finding that despite the applicability of the UNCLOS to the
case, the flexibility of its dispute-settlement procedure was such as to incline the
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id, 54.
203 Id, 53.
204 Id, 54.
205 Id, 57.
206 Lowe, 20 Ausd YB Intl L at 197 (cited in note 150).
207 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, 39 ILM 1359, 58.
Vol. 9 No. 2
The InternationalJudge in an Age of Multiple International Courts and Tribunals
tribunal to relinquish its jurisdiction in favor of the more rigid dispute settlement
mechanisms under the SBT Treaty.20
8
Sir Keith's divergence from the majority on the issue of jurisdiction provides
an example of the use of basic treaty interpretation methodology in addressing
an MIE situation. It did not, under his approach, present a conflict of
jurisdiction. He spoke of the "parallel and overlapping" treaty obligations, which
did not exclude or prejudice each other.209 The key was Article 16 of the SBT
Treaty, which he found, using Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, not to
exclude any other attempts at dispute resolution, including in relation to the
interpretation and application of other treaties. 210 The "separate set of UNCLOS
peaceful settlement obligations exists along with and distinct from the provisions
of article 16.' '211 He argued that the essential point was that the two treaty
regimes (including their settlement procedures) remained distinct; it was not
possible to see the two procedures as interchangeable or that one could be read
into the other.212
The general principle of lex ipedalis (discussed in Section III.B.2 above) is a
possible tool for overcoming such conflicts. 213 Here, in support of its no-
jurisdiction position, Japan argued that the SBT Treaty was the lex specialis over
the general provisions of the UNCLOS. The question was, therefore, which
treaty was more specific than the other, the potential conflict of jurisdiction
being what Lowe describes as specific-specific. In his separate opinion during
the ITLOS stage, ad hoc Judge Shearer found it clearly established that the
intention of the SBT Treaty was to give effect to the prospective obligations of
the parties under the UNCLOS, with respect to the SBT as a highly migratory
species. 214 In the Final Award, the panel acknowledged the support in
international law and in the legal systems of states for the application of a lex
specalis that governs general provisions of an antecedent treaty or statute.2 5
Nevertheless, while the SBT Treaty could be regarded as lex specialis,
international law and state practice allow for more than one treaty to bear upon
208 Id, 41(k).
209 Id at 1395 (Keith concurring).
210 Id, 9.
211 Id at 1395 (Keith concurring).
212 Id, 16.
213 The doctrine has been considered by the ICJ. See Advisory Opinion, Legalio ofthe Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ 240, 25 (July 8, 1996); Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the
Construction ofthe Wall, 2004 ICJ 178, 106 (July 9, 2004).
214 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, 39 ILM at 1647-48 (Shearer concurring).
215 Id, 52.
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a particular dispute.216 The panel could see no reason why a state may not violate
its obligations under more than one treaty; it pointed out that there is often a
"parallelism of treaties, both in their substantive content and in their provisions
for settlement of disputes arising thereunder."2 7 The panel argued that the
conclusion of a more specific implementing convention does not necessarily
vacate the obligations imposed by the general framework convention upon the
parties to the implementing convention (in this case, UNCLOS would be the
framework convention, and the SBT Treaty the implementing convention). The
panel cited the example of how the broad provisions concerning the promotion
of universal respect for and observance of human rights, and the international
obligation to cooperate in the achievement of those purposes found in certain
articles of the Charter of the UN, have not been discharged for parties that have
ratified international human rights treaties.218 To sum up, the lex ipedalis
argument did not work in the particular circumstances of this case, but the panel
did not exclude the application of the rule altogether. The lex spedalis rule
therefore remains a possible means of resolving conflicts of jurisdiction.
IV. CHALLENGES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE:
CONFLICTING JURISPRUDENCE
In a system where there is no hierarchy among the burgeoning courts and
tribunals and no concept of stare decisis or binding precedent, it is only to be
expected that the international judge increasingly faces divergent decisions on
the same issue. We feel it is important to draw the distinction between a direct
clash of jurisprudence, and divergences that can be attributed to much more
pedestrian differences in interpretation and application. Cases of outright
conflict are rare. Most cases said to evidence conflicts actually involve divergent
interpretations. In its classical sense, as propounded by Wilfred Jenks, conflict
exists when joint compliance or simultaneous performance with two different
standards is impossible.219 According to Jenks, these may "prevent a party to
both of the divergent instruments from taking advantage of certain provisions of
one of them recourse to which would involve a violation of, or failure to comply
with, certain requirements of the other., 220 Jenks was speaking of treaties, but
interpretation of treaties or other rules of international law by two or more
tribunals could result in a divergent or conflicting conclusion. Divergent
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 Brit YB Intl L 401, 426 (1953).
220 Id.
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interpretation, although not as provocative as deliberately conflicting
interpretation, is something the international judge needs to avoid. But, there
may be times when he or she simply cannot avoid the divergence because of
error in the earlier decision.
Conflicts of jurisprudence are a much talked-up "result" of the
fragmentation of international law in this age of multiple courts and tribunals.
Such conflicts are nowhere near as common as the flood of literature warrants.
They would not be much of an issue if they were confined to regimes of
international law that operate according to their own standards. But confined
bodies of law create their own problems. No area of international law can exist
in a vacuum; if there were any such area, it could no longer be part of
international law. We now have the example of the WTO Appellate Body
holding that WTO rules should not be interpreted in clinical isolation from
other bodies of international law.221 The ICTY and ICTR illustrate that as the
courts develop their own practice and body of jurisprudence, they are less likely
to consider the work of other courts, but they continue to base their work on
the methodologies and fundamental principles of international law. This
approach gives their own work internal consistency, but the outside world may
be faced with ICTY and ICTR decisions that conflict with the decisions of other
courts and tribunals. When there is a new issue emerging, these tribunals
continue to do what they have always done: find the sources of law and identify
their content, which can involve consideration of the work of other courts and
tribunals. And those works can be inconsistent, requiring the decisionmaker to
take a position.
Inconsistencies in international decisions do not arise just because the judges
or arbitrators take opposite approaches, but sometimes due to nuances in the
treaties that govern the work of courts. For example, decisions under the
African Charter can differ from those under the European Convention on
Human Rights because of the content of these treaties. The ICTY's concept of
the crime against humanity is different from that of the ICTR.222 Such nuances
in the primary sources of law for the tribunals will lead to differences in
interpretation, but the careful international lawyer is usually able to identify the
reasons for that divergence, and handle the situation appropriately. It is not
always the international judge who is to be blamed. Sometimes, to avoid a non
liquet, a situation where there is no applicable law, the international judge has to
be creative and fill gaps in the law. This remains a controversial position and
221 World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc No WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr 29, 1996).
222 Compare 1CTY Statute (1994), art 5, 33 ILM 484 (1994), with ICTR Statute (1994), art 3, 33 ILM
1598 (1994).
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process, and can encourage judicial resistance, which can lead to decisions that
conflict. As long ago as 1933, Hersch Lauterpacht was writing that judges and
arbitrators were actually engaged in a process of evolving the law in the ordinary
course of their judicial function, applying it in innovative ways and setting aside
rules that were obsolete or unjust.223 Some thirty-five years later, then-Assistant
Professor Higgins argued that "[t]here is today at least a minimal agreement that
judges have a creating function, that adjudication is not a mere, automatic
application of existing rules to particular situations. The interpretive function of
judges may do much to fill alleged gaps. 224 That approach was confirmed by the
ICJ's position on Southwest Africa in 1971, which took into account the
evolution of international law in regards to non-self-governing territories. Such
development made modern law different from that which existed at the time of
the creation of South Africa's mandate.225 We see contemporary concern about
judicial propriety in this area in the post-Tadic writings of Judge Shahabuddeen in
this matter, including his view that just because judges may separately pronounce
on the content of international law does not relieve them "of the need, in doing
so, to take account of the desirability of achieving coherence within the same
system"; he argues that an international court has a "legal duty to take account
of the need for coherence in the whole field.
' 226
Be that as it may, conflict or divergence of jurisprudence affects the
predictability and certainty required of legal outcomes, and is hardly encouraging
for those seeking a clear definition of their legal obligations. In the long term,
repeated divergence or conflict erodes the legitimacy of rules and the institutions
that apply these rules. International law, not being equipped with an executive to
enforce the judgments of its courts, must rely on its soft power to compel. This
soft power to compel, among other sources, stems from the legitimacy of its
rules and institutions.
A. THE ICC, ICTR, AND ICTY ON WITNESS-PROOFING
Now that the ICC is up and running, it has already started to issue decisions
that do not follow practices established at the ICTY and ICTR. This is best
illustrated by the dispute over witness-proofing, an issue of international
criminal procedure. There is no doubt that ICC decisions do not bind the ICTY
and ICTR, and vice versa. The ICC and the two ad hoc tribunals are structured
223 Lauterpacht, The Function of Law at 344 (cited in note 26).
224 Rosalyn Higgins, 17 Ind & Comp L Q at 68 (cited in note 41)
225 See Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Securiy Council Resolution 276, 1971 ICJ 16 (June 21, 1971).
226 SemanZa v Prosecutor, Case No ICTR-97-20-A, Judgment, 27, 29 (May 31, 2000) (Shahabuddeen
dissenting).
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differently and work to different procedures, with similar yet different subject-
matter jurisdictions. What is particularly interesting for present purposes is the
way that the courts took different approaches to the issue of proofing witnesses
before trial, the judicial dialogue between the tribunals, and the methods that
they employed in reaching their decisions.
A practice of witness-proofing has developed at the ICTY and ICTR. These
tribunals' respective Statutes and Rules of Procedure are silent on this matter of
preparing prosecution witnesses for their testimony in court. There are two
aspects to this; the first is uncontroversial, and deals with familiarizing the
witness with the proceedings (witness-familiarization). The second is where the
controversy arises: reviewing that witness's testimony (witness-proofing),
including allowing the witness to read his or her earlier witness statement and
pre-testimony interviews. Both practices have been in use for some time, and are
accepted by the judges as being necessary for the better administration of justice,
but there are not many formal decisions of the Chambers addressing this. One
exception arose in the case of Prosecutor v Limaj.227 Here, the Trial Chamber,
faced with a defense challenge to the practice of witness-proofing, found that
reviewing a witness's evidence prior to testimony was permissible as it could be
useful to the entire process. Given the usual length of time between the events
charged in the indictment, the original interview of the witness and the oral
testimony, the Chamber found that witness-proofing assists the tribunal by
providing a detailed review of relevant and irrelevant facts in light of the precise
charges against the accused; aids the process of "human recollection"; enables
"more accurate, complete, orderly and efficient presentation of the evidence of a
witness in the trial"; and identifies and puts the defense on notice of differences
in the recollection of the witness, thus preventing undue surprise.228 Such
witness-proofing needs to be done in accordance with "clear standards of
professional conduct," and cannot amount to coaching the witnesses or
manipulation of testimony.229
Shortly before the first and only witness for the prosecution in the
confirmation hearing for the first case before the ICC was due to be heard, the
issue of witness-proofing arose at the ICC. Subsequent litigation led to a
decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber ("PTC") that, while witness-familiarization
was fully in accordance with the ICC's sources of law, witness-proofing, in the
227 Prosecutor v Limaj, Case No IT-03-66-T, Decision on Defence Motion on Prosecution Practice of
"Proofing" Witnesses (ICTY Dec 10, 2004), available online at <http://www.un.org/icty/limaj/
trialc/decision-e/041210.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
228 Id.
229 Id.
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form identified by the prosecutor, was not.23 ° The PTC dismissed the
prosecution's assertion that witness-proofing was a "widely accepted practice in
international criminal law" as unsupported because most of the cases cited were
irrelevant to the issue at hand, and dismissed the one case (Jima) that was
relevant because it did not "regulate in detail the content of such a practice." '231
The PTC also did not find the practice of witness-proofing to be supported in
sufficient national jurisdictions to amount to a "general principle of law that can
be derived from the national laws of the legal systems of the world" and
observed that this practice would in any event directly contravene the ethical and
professional standards to which the prosecution had voluntarily committed itself
(specifically, Article 705 of the Code of Conduct of the Bar Council of England
and Wales).232
The PTC's Prosecutor v Dyilo decision was directly addressed at both ad hoc
tribunals, where two trial chambers delivered decisions within three days of each
other (Prosecutor v Miluinovi 33 on December 12, 2006, and Prosecutor v Karemara2 34
on December 15, 2006). The Dyilo decision led to applications by defense
counsel for termination of the prosecution's practice of witness-proofing at both
the ICTY and ICTR. In Miluinovic the ICTY Trial Chamber found that the
practice of proofing witnesses was not just widespread and accepted at the
tribunals, but also a widespread practice in countries with an adversarial
process. 235 There was no doubt that the ICC decision did not bind the ICTY in
any way, but the chamber engaged directly with the Dyio decision and was able
to distinguish it on three grounds. 236 Firstly, the ICC PTC in Dyilo had to
consider national laws, some of which admittedly prohibited witness-proofing.
This was unlike the situation at the ICTY. Thus, "the process by which the Dyilo
Chamber came to its decision is not applicable to this Chamber's determination
of the issue." Secondly, at the ICTY there were no prosecutorial undertakings of
the kind that had been given at the ICC. Thirdly, the circumstances at the ICC,
where the Dyilo Chamber was dealing with a single witness coming to testify at
the pre-trial confirmation hearing of the accused, were "a radically different
230 Prosecutor v Dyio, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Practices of Witness Familiarisation
and Witness Proofing (Nov 8, 2006), available online at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Iibrary/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-679_English.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
231 Id, 32.
232 Id, 31-32, 37-41.
233 Prosecutor v Miluinoic, Case No IT-05-87-T, Decision on Ojdanic Motion to Prohibit Witness
Proofing (ICTY Dec 12, 2006).
234 Prosecutor v Karemara, Case No ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Defence Motions to Prevent Witness
Proofing, 8 (Dec 15, 2006).
235 Prosecutor v Miluinovic, Case No IT-05-87-T, 12
236 Id, 11-17.
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situation than that confronted by ICTY on a daily basis for the last thirteen
years." There was also a fourth reason for rejecting the Dyilo decision, and this
was not on grounds of distinction, but of different interpretation about the value
of the practice of witness-proofing. Unlike the ICC PTC, the ICTY found that
discussions between a party and a potential witness regarding his or her evidence
can, in fact, enhance the fairness and expeditiousness of the trial, provided they
are a genuine attempt to clarify the evidence.237 This practice in itself does not
amount to rehearsing, practicing or coaching a witness.238
In Karemara, ICTR Trial Chamber 1II also engaged directly with the Dyio
decision. It found that "the process by which the Dyilo Chamber came to its
decision is not based on a comprehensive knowledge of the established practice
of the ad hoc Tribunals, which is justified by the particularities of these
proceedings that differentiates them from national criminal proceedings., 23 9 The
trial chamber was prepared to approve witness-proofing practices that did not
amount to manipulation of testimony such as comparing prior witness
statements made by the witness, detecting differences and inconsistencies in
recollection of the witness, and allowing a witness to refresh his or her
240
memory.
Almost a year later the matter of witness-proofing was the subject of another
decision at the ICC. Trial Chamber I, which would eventually try Dyilo, allowed
further litigation on this matter.241 This time, the prosecution put forward a
stronger argument supported by more research. Even so, examples of the
practice within national legal systems that were surveyed did not convince the
Trial Chamber that there was a general principle of law allowing the substantive
preparation of witnesses prior to testimony.242 This time, the ICC acknowledged
that witness-proofing, as described by the prosecution, was in fact commonly
utilized at the ad hoc tribunals. It underlined, not surprisingly, that this
precedent was not binding on the Trial Chamber, and that the procedural rules
and jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals could not be automatically applicable
to the ICC without detailed analysis.243 The Trial Chamber did not go into the
details of the Miluinovic and Karemara decisions, but emphasized the structural
differences between the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals:
237 Id, 16.
238 Id.
239 Prosecutor v Karemara, Case No ICTR-98-44-T, 8.
240 Id, 15.
241 Prosecutor v Dyio, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare
and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial (Nov 30, 2007).
242 Id, 41.
243 Id, 44.
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Therefore, the Statute moves away from the procedural regime of the ad hoc
tribunals, introducing additional and novel elements to the process of
establishing the truth. Thus, the procedure of preparation of witnesses before
trial is not easily transferable into the system of law created by the ICC Statute
and Rules. Therefore, while acknowledging the importance of considering the
practice and jurisprudence at the ad hoc tribunals, the Chamber is not
persuaded that the application of ad hoc procedures, in the context of
preparation of witnesses for trial, is appropriate.24
In practical terms, the Trial Chamber approved allowing a witness to read his or
her past statements, as this would aid the effective presentation of the evidence
and help the Trial Chamber in establishing the truth. But it prohibited the
prosecution from discussing the topics that were to be dealt with in court, or
discussing any exhibits that may be shown in court.
At one level, there was conflicting jurisprudence. The ICC was saying one
thing and the ICTY and the ICTR were saying something else. But when one
looks at it more closely, these courts were functioning very much as self-
contained regimes, and the issue of witness-proofing was actually a court-
specific matter. This does not mean the various tribunals were blind to what was
going on elsewhere, for this example also clearly reveals extensive cross-
fertilization between the three courts. The ICTY and ICTR have long been in a
complex symbiotic relationship, sharing the same judges at the appeals level and
similar rules of procedure and evidence. This has encouraged considerable
interflow of ideas and jurisprudence, despite the fact that the two bodies actually
operate under different substantive frameworks (their subject-matter jurisdiction
is different, including the way the crimes are defined). The ICC has now come
into that relationship.
The witness-proofing situation outlined above clearly reveals a judicial
dialogue in process, with a range of tools being used by the courts to manage the
different positions in relation to the prosecution practice under scrutiny. It was
clear that none of the three courts-the ICC, the ICTY and the ICTR-was
bound by the other's decision. Even if the Karemara decision essentially said that
the Dyilo Chamber did not do its homework on the practice at the ad hoc
tribunals (a fair comment), all three took pains to avoid conflict in the
jurisprudence and outright rejection of the decision of another. This effort at
judicial comity is clear in the way the three judicial institutions relied on the
technique of distinction, finding different normative bases for their decisions
and arguing that different situations were at issue.
244 Id, 45.
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B. CONFLICTING JURISPRUDENCE: THE ICTY AND THE ICJ
The case of Tadic before the ICTY's Appeals Chamber is the most notorious
and cited example of an international tribunal expressly rejecting a controversial
legal ruling of the ICJ (specifically, Nicaragua v United States).24 Tadic was the first,
and to date only, direct challenge by another international court to the ICJ. The
facts of the two cases are well known, and the two decisions have attracted
much commentary. What is relevant here is that in 1999, the ICTY's Appeals
Chamber expressly considered and rejected the ICJ's "effective control" test
from its judgment on the merits of the case of the paramilitary activities in and
around Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States)246 and substituted for it a test of
"overall control." This section draws from these well-known decisions and
moves the analysis forward by examining both more recent developments and
the approaches taken by the two courts.
Even with a different composition of judges, the ICTY's "overall control"
test has been confirmed repeatedly by a majority of the Appeals Chamber.24' At
the Peace Palace, the "effective control" test of Nicaragua has stood the test of
time since 1986, and has been applied in cases since Tadic.24" The formulation
chosen for the Articles of State Responsibility ("ASR") adopted by the ILC in
2001 is much closer to the Nicaragua standard, but it is not identical as it does
not identify what degree of control is required.249 In its commentary, the ILC
took the view that the legal and factual issues in the two cases were different,
underlining that the ICTY's mandate was limited to matters of international
criminal responsibility, not state responsibility.25 0 The ILC explained that control
must be of the specific operation and the conduct complained of must be an
integral part of that operation. Rather than confirming whether that control
should be "overall" or "effective", it opted for a flexible case-by-case approach:
"it is a matter for appreciation in each case whether particular conduct was or
245 See Prosecutor v Tadir, Case No IT-94-1-A; Case Concerning Mi'tay and Paramilitagy Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicar v US), Merits, Judgment, I CJ Reports, 14, $ 115 (1986).
246 Id, T 124.
247 Prosecutor v Kordic, Case No IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 299, 307, 313 (Dec 17, 2004); Prosecutor v
Delalic, Case No IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 26 (Feb 20, 2001); Prosecutor v Aleksovksi, Case No IT-
95-14-1-A, Judgment, 134-35 (Mar 24, 2000).
248 See, for example, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Terntogy of the Congo, 45 ILM 562.
249 United Nations, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationaly WrongfulActs, UN Doc A/56/49,
art 8 (2001). Article 8 on conduct directed or controlled by a state reads as follows: "The conduct
of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or
control of, that State in carrying out the conduct."
250 United Nations, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationaly WrongfulActs, with commentaries, UN
Doc A/56/10, 48 (2001).
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was not carried out under the control of a State, to such an extent that the
conduct should be attributed to it."
251
In the ICJ's 2005 Case Concerning Armed Aclivilies on the Territory of the Congo
(Congo v Uganda), the court had to consider the issue of responsibility for the
actions of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo ("MLC"), an irregular
force that fought against the DRC government, to which Uganda provided
training and military support.2 52 But would that support suffice to trigger
responsibility for the MLC's actions? As to whether the MLC was in fact an
organ of Uganda, the court found that it was not.253 It found that the "conduct
of the MLC was not that of an organ of Uganda nor that of an entity exercising
elements of governmental authority on its behalf., 254 As to whether the MLC
was controlled by Uganda, the court considered
whether the MILC's conduct was "on the instructions of, or under the direction
or control of' Uganda (Article 8) and finds that there is no probative evidence
by reference to which it has been persuaded that this is the case. Accordingly,
no issue arises in the present case as to whether the requisite tests are met for
sufficiency of control of paramilitaries (see Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) . ). .255
Clearly, Article 8 of the ASR is being applied by the ICJ as if it were identical to
the Nicaragua test.
Congo v Uganda offered an opportunity for the ICJ to tackle the Tadic test, to
put forth the court's view on the ICTY's direct challenge to its earlier decision,
to express some views on whether there was in fact a hierarchy of courts and
tribunals, and to offer guidance to the plethora of courts engaged in issues
concerning the Geneva Conventions of 1949, as well as issues of imputability
leading to state responsibility. But the ICJ ignored this opportunity. There was
no mention of the "overall control" test in the judgment or in the dissents and
separate opinions.256 The ICJ applied its usual "effective control" test, citing the
ASR alongside its own previous decision in Nicaragua. The silence on the Tadic
251 Id.
252 See generally Case Concerning Armed Acivilies on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v Uganda), 45 ILM
271 (ICJ Dec 19, 2005).
253 Id, 160.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 As with the judgment itself, the dissents and separate opinions managed to engage with the
Nicaragua decision and avoid all mention of the Tadic test. That is not to say that Tadic was
ignored, for it was not. It was, for example, used as authority for the geographical and temporal
application of international humanitarian law; for examples of opinions which discuss Nicaragua
while ignoring Tadic, and use other aspects of Tadic, see id, 19-25 (Kooijimans); id, 4-8
(Simma); id, 9 (Koroma); id, $ 12 (Tomka); id, 1 12-34 (Kateka). It is all very surreal, as if the
Tadic test had never been created.
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test was remarkable, leading towards the conclusion that it was of no import to
the ICJ. However, that may not be the entire picture, for the ICJ is known for its
unwillingness to refer to the decisions of other courts and tribunals, apart from
its predecessor, the PCIJ. One could also read from such silence that the World
Court does not in fact see itself as the "senior" court, and so was not in a
position to correct a less authoritative court. In an article written after the DRC
case, Judge Higgins acknowledged that "some differences of perception between
the ICJ and ICTY do remain on this control test for purposes of responsibility,
but given the different relevant contexts, they hardly constitute a drama. 257
What is proclaimed by many as the great clash of the titans is here reduced to
"some difference of perception".
In the Bosnia Genocide case, the parties litigated the standard of attribution
and the Tadic case was expressly raised.25 8 Eight years after the ICTY Appeals
Chamber decision, the ICJ, under the presidency of Judge Rosalyn Higgins,
finally addressed its challenge.259 This case is also remarkable for being the first
(the authors are not aware of any other such example) in which the ICJ actually
engaged with the substance of a decision of another international court (other
than the PCIJ). The majority cited two carefully reasoned grounds for rejecting
the Tadic position, both of which had been discussed in the flood of literature
inspired by the case. 260 But nowhere did it assert its "superiority" or hierarchical
"seniority" to the ICTY. The first reason for rejecting Tadic was that the ICTY
was not called upon in that case, nor was it in general called upon to rule on
questions of state responsibility, since its jurisdiction was criminal and extended
over persons only. As a result, what the ICTY said in that case was obiter
dictum, "an issue which was not indispensable for the exercise of its
jurisdiction," an issue of general international law which does not lie within the
specific purview of its jurisdiction, and, moreover, the resolution of which is not
always necessary for deciding the criminal cases before it. This, of course, begs
257 Higgins, 55 Ind & Comp L Q at 795 (cited in note 21).
258 See the transcript of oral arguments of both parties in the Case Concerning the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and
Montenegro) (Mar 13, 2006), available online at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/91/10535.pdf> (visited Nov 21, 2008). See also Case Concerning the Application
of the Convention, 46 ILM 188 (2007).
259 See Case Concerning Armed Acivities on the Ternitogy of the Congo, 45 ILM 271, 160. See also Higgins,
55 Intl & Comp L Q at 795 (cited in note 21) (for comments); Case Concerning the Application of the
Convention, 46 ILM at 288, 406.
260 See, for example, Marco Sassoli and Laura M. Olson, The Judgement of the ICIT Appeals Chamber on
the Merits in the Tadic Case: New Horizons for International Humanitarian and Criminal Law?, 82 Ind Rev
Red Cross 733 (2000), available online at <http://icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.
nsf/html/57JQQC> (visited Dec 5, 2008)
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the question of whether the ICJ would have deferred to the views of the ICTY,
if the latter's view went to the reasoning of the case it decided.
The second ground for dismissing the argument that the Tadic test should
apply concerned the standard itself. The court did not exclude the possibility
that the "overall control" test could possibly be relevant in the ICTY context,
but declined to take a position. However, it was prepared to state that the ICTY
was wrong to present the "overall control" test as if it were equally applicable in
international criminal law as under the law of state responsibility. The ICJ found
the ICTY Appeals Chamber's argument unpersuasive on a number of grounds.
One ground was that logic did not require the same test to be adopted in
resolving the two issues, which were very different in nature. Also, the ICJ took
the position that the degree and nature of a state's involvement in an armed
conflict on another state's territory required to internationalize that conflict can
differ from that required to give rise to the state's responsibility for acts
committed in the course of the conflict. The ICJ also noted that the ICTY's
coverall control" test had the major drawback of broadening the scope of state
responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle governing the law of
international responsibility. The ICJ underlined that a state's responsibility can
be incurred for wrongful acts committed by persons or groups of persons who
are neither state organs nor equated with such organs only if they are attributable
to it under the rule of customary international law reflected in Article 8 of the
ILC's ASR. The "overall control" test was unsuitable, "for it stretches too far,
almost to breaking point, the connection which must exist between the conduct
of a state's organs and its international responsibility. 261 The Bosnia Genocide
judgment provides the only extant example of the ICJ engaging directly with the
conflicting decision of another court, and finding that court's reasoning to be
flawed.
There is no formal hierarchy between the two courts, and the ICTY was not
bound to abide by the controversial Nicaragua standard. The Appeals Chamber
was breaking no norm or rule of international law, or its own constitutive
documents, by rejecting the ICJ's "effective control" test. What is at issue is
whether it should have done so; to borrow from Judge Shahabuddeen, was it
necessary?26 2 Should the ICTY judges have considered the impact of what they
were doing, the uncertainty that they were creating and the resulting damage to
261 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention, 46 ILM, 406.
262 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1 -A, 5 (Shahabuddeen concurring). See also his declaration in
the Blaskic Trial Judgment, where he argued that the "effective control test to be extracted from
the judgement of the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua is sound"; Prosecutor v Blaskic,
Case No IT-95-14-T Judgment, at 272 (Mar 3, 2000) (Shahabuddeen); Antonio Cassese, The
Nicaragua and Tadii Tests Revsited in lIght of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 Eur J Ind L 649
(2007) (defending the Tadic "overall control test" in light of the Bosnia Genocide Case).
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the legitimacy of the international legal system that would arise from the assault
on the ICJ? Judge Shahabuddeen's concerns would eventually coalesce in a sharp
rebuke to Tadic, expressed in his statement that it is the responsibility of the
tribunal to "show deference to the views of the ICJ as to what is customary
international law. ,263
There were several other options available to the Appeals Chamber. It could
have followed Nicaragua, stating its grounds for dissatisfaction yet acting in the
interests of consistency in international jurisprudence. It could have easily
distinguished its decision, based as it was on international criminal law involving
an individual on trial for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
from that of the state responsibility at issue in Nicaragua. This was a point made
by Judge Shahabuddeen in his separate opinion.264 The technique of distinction
on a substantive issue has already been discussed in relation to the witness-
proofing matter in Section IV.A above. It was also used in the decision on the
immunity of former Liberian President Charles Taylor at the Sierra Leone court;
in that decision, the court cited the ICJ's Arrest Warrant case (DRC v Belgium), but
distinguished it on the facts.26 One commentator argued that the fact that there
was a ten-year difference between Tadic and Nicaragua, with much development
in the law, would have enabled the Tribunal to distinguish its case from that of
the ICJ. 266 This assumes that the law changed; Tadic was in fact based on
Nicaragua being wrong at the point in time at which it was decided, and
continuing to be wrong. The Tadic judgment gives the impression that the ICTY
Appeals Chamber, or at least certain judges within it, were determined to take on
the ICJ in relation to Nicaragua, and Tadic served as a useful vehicle for doing so.
They caused the first real conflict in jurisprudence. Until the ICJ addressed the
issue in the Bosnia Genocide Case, there were two conflicting tests; since that
judgment, and if one accepts that judgment as being correct, there are two tests
for two different situations. That conflict of jurisprudence is no more, at least in
the eyes of the ICJ.
C. CONFLICTING JURISPRUDENCE IN INVESTMENT DISPUTES
A comprehensive study by Susan Franck has documented how investment
arbitral tribunals and other tribunals have rendered a number of inconsistent
263 SemanZa v Prosecutor, Case No ICTR-97-20-A, Judgment, 27, 29 (May 31, 2000) (Shahabuddeen
dissenting).
264 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-A, 16-21 (Shahabuddeen concurring).
265 Prosecutor v Taylor, Case No SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (May 31,
2004); Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April2000 (DRC v Belgium), 2002 ICJ 3 (Feb 14, 2002).
266 Karin Oellers-Frahm, Muliph'kation of International Courts and Tribunals and Confliting Jurisdiction-
Problems and Possible Solutions, 5 Max Planck YB UN L 67, 80 (2001).
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decisions.26 An example of this arose in the investment dispute between the
government of the Czech Republic and a US investor named Ronald Lauder.
The Media Council of the Czech Republic cancelled the license of a company
("CME") and caused economic loss to Mr. Lauder and CME. This matter was
put before two different arbitral tribunals based on the bilateral investment
treaties between the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, and between the
Czech Republic and the US.
In the first case, Mr. Lauder commenced a United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law arbitral proceeding in London under the US-Czech
Bilateral Investment Treaty ("BIT") in August 1999. As the majority shareholder
of CME, he alleged that the Czech Republic violated the US-Czech BIT
through the actions of the Media Agency and caused him economic losses. The
US-Czech BIT gives protection to an indirect investor.268 A few months later, a
company he controlled, CME Czech Republic BV, started arbitral proceedings at
a Stockholm arbitration facility against the Czech Republic under the
Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT.269 The same facts thereby generated disputes
under two separate legal instruments. The difference is that in one case Mr.
Lauder brought the action (as an indirect investor) and in the other case, CMR
Czech Republic BV brought the action. The awards were made within ten days
of each other. Although the applicants wanted the claims to be consolidated, the
Czech Republic refused to agree to the consolidation. 210 The award made by the
Stockholm-based arbitral body was further challenged before the Svea Appeals
Court in Sweden (a domestic court) pursuant to the rules of the BIT. This
appeal did not succeed.
The London and Stockholm arbitral tribunals (and the Svea Appeals Court)
arrived at conflicting decisions on diverse issues relating to expropriation, fair
and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and compliance with
minimum obligations under international law, despite the identical or similar
267 Susan D. Franck, The Legiimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privating Public International
Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L Rev 1521, 1568-82 (2005). See also Charles N.
Brower and Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Coming Crisis in the GlobalAdjudicaion System, 19 Arb Ind 415
(2003).
268 See Treaty with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment (1992), art I(1)a, available online at
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43557.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008) ("Bilateral
Investment Treaty between the Czech Republic & USA').
269 This was notwithstanding other pending cases before a domestic court and other related
arbitrations.
270 See CM4E Czech Republic BV (The Netherlands) v The CZecb Republic, Final Award, 426-28
(UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings Mar 14, 2003), available online at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/CME-2003-Final_001 .pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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nature of the two BIT provisions involved.27' The London-based arbitral
tribunal concluded that no action tantamount to expropriation occurred, since
there was no direct or indirect interference by the Czech Republic; 22 that the
replacement of the Media Council in 1994 did not amount an arbitrary and
discriminatory measure by the Czech Republic; 2 3 that the respondent did not
violate the prohibition against arbitrary and discriminatory measures;27 4 that
there was no inconsistent conduct on the part of the Media Council which
would have amounted to unfair and inequitable treatment;25 that none of the
actions or inactions of the Media Council caused direct or indirect damage to the
investment of Mr. Lauder;2 6 and that therefore there was no violation of the
obligation to provide full protection and security under the Treaty.277 The
London tribunal made only one declaration in favor of the applicant, namely
that the respondent breached its obligation to refrain from arbitrary and
discriminatory measures when in the winter of 1993, it changed its original
position.27 ' This, however, did not result in an order of compensation for
damages; the relief sought by the claimant was denied.2 9
On the other hand, the Stockholm Arbitral Panel gave a partial award on
September 13, 2001, with one member dissenting, declaring that the Czech
Republic violated the following provisions of the Netherlands-Czech Republic
BIT: the obligation of fair and equitable treatment (Article 3(1)); the obligation
not to impair investments by unreasonable and discriminatory measures (Article
3(1)); the obligation of full security and protection (Article 3(2)); the obligation
to treat foreign investments in conformity with principles of international law
(Articles 3(5) and 8(6)); and the obligation not to deprive the claimant of its
investment (Article 5).280 Having found in favor of the claimant in a manner
dramatically opposed to the London Arbitral Tribunal's Award, the Stockholm
271 For a detailed comparison of conflicting awards, see Franck, 73 Fordham L Rev at 1563-68 (cited
in note 267).
272 Lauder v The Czech Republic, Final Award, 201 (Sept 3, 2001), available online at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LauderAward.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
273 Id, 240.
274 Id, 284.
275 Id, 295.
276 Id, 313.
277 Id, 309.
278 Id, 319.
279 Id, 319(3).
280 See CME Czech Republic B V (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, Partial Award (Sept 3, 2001) 14
World Trade & Arb Mat 109. See also CME Czech Republic BV (Fhe Netherlands) v The Czech
Republic, Final Award, 1 52 (reiterating the partial award).
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Tribunal awarded in damages the sum of US$269,814,000 plus interest at the
rate of 10 percent from February 23, 2003.281
As mentioned earlier, the Czech Republic sought to have the Stockholm
award set aside. It raised a number of issues, including the claim that an
arbitrator had been excluded from the panel's deliberations; alleged failure of the
tribunal to take into consideration applicable law; whether the tribunal exceeded
its mandate; and whether the judgment of the Court of Appeals may be
appealed.282 Most importantly for our discussion, it alleged lack of jurisdiction
due to lispendens and res judicata. However, as noted, the tribunals decided that
lis pendens and res judicata were not present. These challenges were based on
procedural grounds, and in a sense, not an appeal on the merits of the arbitral
award. The appeals court rejected these challenges and upheld the award made
by the Stockholm Tribunal.2 3
The two tribunals were not concerned about the overlapping proceedings
and resulting inconsistencies. The tribunal established pursuant to the US-Czech
Republic BIT simply stated that since the "arbitration proceedings involve
different parties and different causes of action ... no possibility exists that any
other court or tribunal can render a decision similar to or inconsistent with the
award which will be issued by this Arbitral Tribunal., 284 Eventually, according to
the other tribunal (established under the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT), any
"overlapping of the results of parallel processes must be dealt with on the level of
loss and quantum but not on the level of breach of treaty."28 The Svea Court of
Appeals also stated that "since Lauder and CME cannot be deemed to be the
same party, one of the prerequisites for lispendens and resjudicata is lacking. 286
Technically speaking, the parties were different and different treaties were
invoked. But the fact remains that the complaint concerned the action of the
Czech Republic, which detrimentally affected the rights of an investor in his
personal capacity, and the company that he controlled. The conclusion-that
whatever inconsistency might arise could be resolved at the quantum stage-
seems to be misguided, as both tribunals arrived at conflicting conclusions on
issues arising from identical fact situations. Eventually, the Czech Republic had
to pay compensation despite the fact that another tribunal declared it not to be
281 CME Czech Republic B V (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, Final Award, § IX(l).
282 See Czech Republic v CME Czech Republic BV, Case No T 8735-01 (May 15, 2003), 42 ILM 919
(Svea Court of Appeals).
283 See id.
284 Lauder v Czech Republic, Final Award, 171 (emphasis added).
285 CME Cech Republic BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 14 World Trade &
Arb Mat, 419.
286 Czech Republic v CME Czech Republic BV, 42 ILM at 967.
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liable. This is disappointing, although, to an extent, there are some technical
grounds that justify the outcome. Consolidation of the two cases, as requested
by the two applicants, was not possible as the Czech Republic refused to agree.
The end result was two parallel proceedings, with two contradictory findings.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This Article has focused on identifying what the international judge can do
to avoid conflicts and manage the situation in the current climate of multiple
courts and tribunals. While the authors aim to stimulate a wider discussion about
the feasibility and content of their Guidelines for International Judges in
managing MIEs, competing jurisdictions, and conflicting jurisprudence, there is
only so much that the international judge can single-handedly do. As has been
described earlier in this Article, this is a systemic problem, and it requires a
systemic approach.
There needs to be a parallel effort with the other actors in the international
legal system. As with so many other situations, prevention is always preferable to
searching for a cure. It is important to settle the proper role of the international
judge in a fast-evolving world of international courts and tribunals, with
increasing judicialization of international law. States need, at an early stage, to
put more effort into anticipating and avoiding unnecessary situations of
competing jurisdictions and into preventing conflicting jurisprudence from
arising in the first place. States need to be more aware of the ramifications of the
new courts and tribunals that they are creating, as well as the implications of the
increasing prevalence of compulsory jurisdiction clauses in treaties.
Taking the WTO dispute-settlement process as an example, the linkage to
general practices of treaty interpretation in Article 3.2 of the DSU is certainly a
bridge between Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, which have
attained the status of rules of customary or general international law, as
confirmed by the WTO Appellate Body.287 Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention allows tribunals to take into account other "relevant rules of
international law" for contextual interpretation. 288 But that provision goes to
context and treaty interpretation; it cannot enable the parties or the WTO DSB
to use those other treaties as sources of law relevant to the dispute. Thus, a new
approach is needed, perhaps a change in the DSU rules or the Agreement itself,
allowing the panel, at the request of a party, to consider the dispute in its
287 See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Japan--Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WTO Doc No WT/DSI1/AB/R at 104 (Sept 25, 1996); World Trade Organization, Report of
the Appellate Body, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc
No WT/DS2/AB/R at 17 (Apr 29, 1996).
288 Consider ILC Report on Fragmentation (cited in note 24).
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entirety. But that may not work, as it would expand the work of the WTO
beyond international trade disputes. The WTO's Appellate Body has pointed out
that the WTO Agreement is "not to be read in clinical isolation from public
international law," but that is not a license to bring in all the treaties that could
possibly apply to a particular situation.R9
Likewise, a "constitutionalization" of international adjudication (as part of
the so-called "constitutionalization" of international law) both at the conceptual
and institutional level could be argued for.290 Constitutionalization in this context
refers to an organization of the system of international adjudication along certain
normative and institutional values and patterns. This constitutionalization
demands that the participants agree on these fundamental values and principles.
Some aspects of institutional consolidation at the international level have already
been implemented or proposed.29' Conceptually, there have also been proposals
that seek to constitutionalize international law with a view to reforming radically
its norms and structures.292 Clearly, these proposals lie far in the future. In the
meantime, the following are some suggestions for what can be done in the here
and now.
289 World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc No WT/DS2/AB/R 17 (Apr 29, 1996).
290 Consider Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations
Revisited, 1 Max Planck YB UN Law 1 (1997); Theodor Schilling, On the Constitutionalization of
General International Law, Jean Monnet Working Paper 06/05 (NYU School of Law 2005);
Francisco Orrego Vicufia, International Dispute Settlement in an Evolving Global Sociey:
ConstituionaliZation, Accessibiliy, PrivatiZation 156 (Cambridge 2004); Ernest-Ulrich Petersmann,
How to Reform the UN System? Constitutionalism, International Law, and International Organizations 10
Leiden J Ind L 421 (1997).
291 See, for example, Decision on the Merger of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rghts and the Court
of Justice of the Afican Union Assembly, Assembly/AU/Dec.83(V) (July 4-5, 2005), available online
at <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/hog/Decisions-Sirte-j uly-2 0
05.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008). There are also proposals to establish an International Human
Rights Court that could replace the several human rights treaty bodies, and of course, there is
debate about reform of the UN. Consider also recent developments with the accession of the EU
to the European Convention on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, such as the enabling
of the ECtHR to have the ultimate say in human rights matters within the EU. See European
Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1610, The Accession of the European Union/European Community to
the European Convention on Human Rights, (Apr 17, 2008), available online at
<http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta8/ERES161O.htm>
(visited Dec 5, 2008).
292 See Philip Allott, International Law and International Revolution: Reconceiving the World in David
Freestone, Surya Subedi, and Scott Davidson, eds, Contemporary Issues in International Law: A
Collection of the Josephine Onoh Memorial Lectures 77 (Kluwer 2002); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Constitutionalism and InternationalAdjudication: How to Constitutionalise the UN Dispute Settlement System,
31 NYU J Intl L & Pol 753 (1999); Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of
the International Communit, 36 Colum J Transnatl L 529 (1998).
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If states are to avoid situations of the kind we have been concerned with,
they need to be more careful to insert appropriate provisions on managing
disputes over jurisdiction and jurisprudence into treaties. But that is not
straightforward. Using the WTO Agreement as an example again, the DSU's
closed list of multilateral treaties that the panels may refer to could be opened
up, but the DSU cannot list every treaty in existence, nor can it have jurisdiction
over every treaty that a party before it is bound by. At this juncture, a proposal
by Joost Pauwelyn to distinguish between "jurisdiction" and the "applicable law"
may prove useful.293 Briefly, the WTO DSB only has jurisdiction under the
covered agreements, but its "applicable law" is not limited to those listed in the
covered agreements. Perhaps the solution may lie in consent of the parties. They
may, on an ad hoc basis, allow the court to decide a trade dispute that has
ramifications over other areas. This, however, raises a new and wholly
unsatisfactory situation that is guaranteed to damage the international system:
international trade lawyers making decisions on matters of international human
rights law or international environmental law.
The ICJ is probably the right candidate for giving guidance on matters of
general international law as it is a court of general jurisdiction, a principal organ
of the UN and the most senior court with eminently qualified judges at its
disposal. Notwithstanding the practical obstacles relating to the amendment of
its Statute, it is possible to do something with what we already have. For
instance, as noted earlier, Article 34(3) of the ICJ Statute allows the court to
liaise with and seek the views of public international organizations whose
constitutive documents or conventions have been invoked in a proceeding
before it.294 This creates a proper forum to engage in a dialogue. The ICJ cannot
force these organizations to submit their views, but it may urge them to do so in
the interest of promoting uniformity in the interpretation of the provisions of
international rules invoked in the proceedings before it. The ICJ may also
encourage amicus curiae briefs that help elucidate challenging issues intersecting
different subsystems of international law.29
The role of the legal community writ large also deserves special attention in
this regard. By this we mean the "invisible college" of professional lawyers,
negotiators, advocacy groups, etc. Those who teach need to try to reach as many
future legal practitioners as possible, teaching a non-idiosyncratic and coherent
293 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How IWTO Law Relates to Other Rules of
International Law 456 (Cambridge 2003).
294 See Statute of the ICJ, art 34(3).
295 Major courts and tribunals including the WTO Panels and its Appellate Body, NAFTA, the ICTY
and ICTR, and human rights courts allow for amicus curiae submissions on legal issues arising in
pending cases from various interest groups, professional bodies and individuals.
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understanding of international law that does not paper over the many crevasses,
yet highlights the fundamental principles and the increasing unity and stability in
our discipline. And, to borrow from Koskenniemi, if international lawyers are to
contribute towards a coherent understanding and application of the rules of
international law, it is important that they develop an ability to feel "at home in
[the various subsystems of international law], yet imprisoned in none of
them." '2 96 This requires international legal professionals to be as versatile as Swiss
Army knives in terms of their knowledge of the various subsystems of
international law, with an attitude that attaches equal importance to norms
belonging to these various subsystems. It is inspiring to observe some of the
leading international lawyers appearing as judges, arbitrators, counsel or advisors
within different functional areas. For example, Professor Georges Abi-Saab
served as ad hoc judge of the ICJ, judge of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY
and ICTR, Commissioner of the UN Compensation Commission, and Chairman
of the Appellate Body of the WTO. He is not alone, but there are not many like
him. Such shifting roles will undoubtedly promote the values of mutual
understanding and system building. The same principle applies to lawyers who
have legal practices that cut across the different functional areas of international
law.
VI. CHARTING THE WAY FORWARD: GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL JUDGES
It is imperative to provide the international judge with guidance in a world
where MIE is increasingly common, leading to the risk of competing
jurisdictions and conflicting jurisprudence. With due consideration for both
avoidance and management so as to minimize negative effects, the following
guidelines are proposed as a starting point for a wider discussion.
1. GENERAL GUIDELINES
1.1 The proper function of the international judge in international
adjudication is an issue which has been controversial for a long
time. Absent consensus, it is a fact that international judges are
engaged in a process of authoritative decision making and that
they are part of a wider system of international law that needs, in
order to retain its legitimacy as a regulator of international
296 Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law between Technique and Politics, 70 Mod L Rev
1, 29 (2007).
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society, to function in an orderly manner and provide certainty,
predictability and uniformity of application and result.
1.2 International judges, being part of this wider international
system, are in a symbiotic relationship with each other. They
must have the appropriate specialization in the common
discipline of public international law, and closely follow
international legal developments at other courts and tribunals.
International judges have a common responsibility to cooperate
and work in a way that is complementary, rather than opposed.
1.3 The decisions of the international judge may, because of the
nature of the system, sometimes be colored by non-legal
considerations such as assessment of the impact of the decision
on the wider system. But even if decision making may sometimes
be colored by issues that are non-juridical, the international judge
must still operate in accordance with the doctrines and
methodologies of the discipline of public international law.
Treaty interpretation, for example, is to be by way of the Vienna
Convention. As the ILC has pointed out, the Vienna Convention
provides a toolbox for dealing with fragmentation and serves as a
framework for assessing and managing it in a "legal-
professional" way.29
1.4 In general, judges should keep within their own specialization
and within areas that they are mandated to rule on. Where it is
necessary for resolution of the dispute before them, they should
be able to venture beyond these boundaries, but remain subject
to the guidelines.
2. GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTING AND MANAGING
MUPTIPLE INSTITUTION ENGAGEMENT AND
COMPETING JURISDICTIONS
2.1 Multiple Institution Engagement ("MIE") is becoming
increasingly common in modern international dispute settlement,
297 ILC Report on Fragmentation, 17, 20 (cited in note 24). However, the ILC did not provide
international judges with any such tools.
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but this is not the same thing as competing jurisdiction between
courts.
2.2 International judges should not be territorial or competitive over
jurisdiction.
2.3 The intention of the parties must be a controlling factor.
2.4 International judges should also consider the nature of the
dispute in context. They should take a system-sensitive approach
that does not result in injustice for the parties. They should take
care that their decisions do not contribute to the overall
delegitimization of the international dispute-settlement process.
2.5 International judges sometimes have the discretion to decline to
exercise jurisdiction. Simply having jurisdiction does not always
mean it is best to exercise it. Judicial economy is a key
consideration. Other courts and tribunals may have a stronger
claim to jurisdiction. Other courts and tribunals may also have
parallel jurisdiction looking at different aspects of the dispute;
this is not competing jurisdiction but rather complementary
jurisdiction that in the particular circumstances may mean that
the matter is dealt with in an orderly and comprehensive manner
and no party is denied justice for legitimate grievances.
2.6 International judges should consider the standards for their own
exercise of jurisdiction in a consistent manner. Several standards
are currently being used. "Prima facie" is the standard used for
assessing jurisdiction for the purposes of precautionary measures
and there are at least three standards-"clearly established,"
"sufficiently clear," and "firmly established"-used when
deciding to exercise jurisdiction over the merits. More
consistency must be developed in this matter.
2.7 Where there is MIE, the courts and tribunals that are seized with
the matter have several options:
2.7.1 Insisting on exercising jurisdiction. This would be
appropriate, for example, where the court clearly has
exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, such as under a
treaty.
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2.7.2 Deferring to the jurisdiction of another court or tribunal.
This would be possible, for example, where the other
court was seized of the matter first or the other court is a
specialized court and the matter is purely within that
specialization, or where most of a dispute falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the other court, with
nonexclusive jurisdiction falling to both bodies.
2.7.3 "Wait and see." This technique could be used, for
example, where the courts that have been seized both
have equally valid grounds for exercising jurisdiction, or
where there are two specialized courts seized, and the
parties may be persuaded to refer the matter to a court of
general jurisdiction that could look at the dispute in its
entirety.
2.8 In managing a situation of MIE to avoid a conflict of
jurisdiction, and in managing a situation where there is in fact
such conflict, international judges may consider appropriate use
of the following doctrines, techniques and considerations: res
judicata; electa una via and/or As alibi pendens lex spedali,
substantial connection; forum non conveniens; choice of law;
and judicial economy.
2.9 If there is MIE, every effort should be made for inter-
institutional engagement and dialogue. This promotes judicial
economy. Two tribunals seized of the same matter may, for
example, agree to take joint depositions from the same witnesses.
The two tribunals may, for example, reach agreement on custody
of original documents.
2.10 A court of general jurisdiction such as the ICJ could be called
upon to play a more active role. There are of course many
difficulties in creating a role for the ICJ in deciding genuine
conflicts of jurisdiction between courts and tribunals, as this
would require amending the court's Statute. However, it is
possible for the parties, in situations where there is no
compulsory jurisdiction clause in a treaty, and MIE involving
different legal issues occurs, to withdraw all claims and by mutual
agreement refer the matter to the ICJ as a court of general
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jurisdiction able to hear the dispute in its entirety. Article 34(3) of
the ICJ Statute creates a mechanism whereby international
organizations, whose constitutive documents or conventions are
invoked in an ICJ proceeding, are requested to provide their
views. International organizations should be encouraged to make
use of that procedure.
3. GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTING AND MANAGING
CONFLICTS OF JURISPRUDENCE
3.1 International judges need to beware of the dangers of creating
unnecessary conflicts of jurisprudence. They also need to be able
to deal with conflicting normative and factual findings from
different courts and tribunals in a coherent and doctrinally
principled manner. The way they deal with both creation and
management of conflicts can affect the international legal system
and damage its legitimacy.
3.2 Where possible, international judges should strive to ensure there
is complementarity and consistency, as opposed to confrontation
and conflict (although these may sometimes be necessary where
a decision is clearly wrong in law and fact, by the estimation of
the court considering it). Differences in interpretation do not
equal conflicts of jurisdiction. A coherent body of law does not
require identical decisions, but sufficient consistency, including in
the application of basic principles.
3.3 It is essential that international judges be well trained in the basic
principles of public international law. International judges who
have that soundness of background will be "speaking the same
language" as their counterparts, that language being essential for
operation in international dispute settlement. This reduces the
risks of conflicting jurisprudence on core issues.
3.4 There is no doctrine of stare decisis in international law, and
there is no formal hierarchy between international courts and
tribunals. But the decisions of other courts and tribunals should
be treated with respect and given careful consideration. Some
courts have superior competence in their area of specialization
and their decisions in that area should generally be deferred to.
For instance, a decision from a specialized court on that
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specialized issue has more weight than a general court on that
same matter. A decision from the ICJ on a general principles
issue has more weight than what a specialized court says about
general principles. The weight to be given to a decision will also
depend on whether the body in which the decision originates is
judicial or quasi-judicial.
3.5 The following techniques may aid the international judge in
managing competing jurisprudence:
3.5.1 Competing jurisprudence calls upon the court to conduct
its own investigations. For example, a court that is faced
with a situation such as Tadic v. Nicaragua should conduct
its own investigations to establish the true state of
customary international law.
3.5.2 Disagreeing with a decision is not sufficient grounds for
rejecting the position taken by another court or tribunal.
The international judge should consider self-restraint and
judical comity when considering issuing a decision that
directly conflicts with that of another court or tribunal.
Two vital issues to be considered are: is it necessary to
take this approach, and what are the implications in this
case and to the wider system? International judges should
consider whether techniques such as distinguishing
between cases, and the doctrine of lex specialis, can
effectively be used to achieve the same result. These are,
of course, sometimes not suitable. For example, a mere
change in terminology may not suffice to avoid a
problem.298
3.5.3 Judicial comity and basic professionalism require an
international judge who chooses to reject the position of
another court to explain that decision and his or her
reasoning for rejecting the earlier decision of another
court or tribunal.
298 Prosecutor v Blaskic, Case No IT-95-14-T at 235 (citing Guff of Maine, ICJ Reports 1984, 6 (Judge
Gros dissenting)).
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3.5.4 To the extent necessary, international judges should
encourage amicus curiae submissions in disputes on the
law or where dealing with areas where they are less
proficient.
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